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Neuroscientists​ ​commonly​ ​assume​ ​that​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​generates​ ​representations​ ​of​ ​a​ ​scene​ ​in​ ​various 
non-retinotopic​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frames,​ ​for​ ​example​ ​in​ ​‘egocentric’​ ​and​ ​‘allocentric’​ ​frames. 
Although​ ​neurons​ ​in​ ​early​ ​visual​ ​cortex​ ​might​ ​be​ ​described​ ​as​ ​representing​ ​a​ ​scene​ ​in​ ​an 
eye-centred​ ​frame,​ ​using​ ​2​ ​dimensions​ ​of​ ​visual​ ​direction​ ​and​ ​one​ ​of​ ​binocular​ ​disparity,​ ​there 
is​ ​no​ ​convincing​ ​evidence​ ​of​ ​similarly​ ​organized​ ​cortical​ ​areas​ ​using​ ​non-retinotopic​ ​3D 
coordinate​ ​frames​ ​nor​ ​of​ ​any​ ​systematic​ ​transfer​ ​of​ ​information​ ​from​ ​one​ ​frame​ ​to​ ​another.​ ​We 
propose​ ​that​ ​perception​ ​and​ ​action​ ​in​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​world​ ​could​ ​be​ ​achieved​ ​without​ ​generating​ ​ego-​ ​or 
allocentric​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frames.​ ​Instead,​ ​we​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​the​ ​fundamental​ ​operation​ ​the​ ​brain 
carries​ ​out​ ​is​ ​to​ ​compare​ ​a​ ​long​ ​state​ ​vector​ ​with​ ​a​ ​matrix​ ​of​ ​weights​ ​(essentially,​ ​a​ ​long​ ​look-up 
table)​ ​to​ ​choose​ ​an​ ​output​ ​(often,​ ​but​ ​not​ ​necessarily,​ ​a​ ​motor​ ​output).​ ​The​ ​processes​ ​involved 
in​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​scene​ ​and​ ​action​ ​within​ ​it​ ​depend,​ ​we​ ​suggest,​ ​on​ ​successive​ ​iterations​ ​of 
this​ ​basic​ ​operation.​ ​Advantages​ ​of​ ​this​ ​proposal​ ​include​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​it​ ​relies​ ​on 
computationally​ ​well-defined​ ​operations​ ​corresponding​ ​to​ ​well-established​ ​neural​ ​processes. 
Also,​ ​we​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​from​ ​a​ ​philosophical​ ​perspective​ ​it​ ​is​ ​at​ ​least​ ​as​ ​plausible​ ​as​ ​theories 
postulating​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frames.​ ​Finally,​ ​we​ ​suggest​ ​a​ ​variety​ ​of​ ​experiments​ ​that​ ​would 
falsify​ ​our​ ​claim. 
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1. Introduction 
For​ ​an​ ​observer​ ​to​ ​perceive​ ​and​ ​operate​ ​successfully​ ​in​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​world​ ​it​ ​is​ ​often​ ​assumed​ ​that​ ​the 
brain​ ​must​ ​generate​ ​3D​ ​models​ ​or​ ​reconstructions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​scene​ ​in​ ​a​ ​range​ ​of​ ​coordinate​ ​frames 
(retinotopic,​ ​head-centred,​ ​hand-centred,​ ​body-centred,​ ​world-centred)​ ​and​ ​that​ ​there​ ​must​ ​be​ ​a 
series​ ​of​ ​complex​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​transformations​ ​to​ ​convert​ ​information​ ​from​ ​one​ ​frame​ ​to 
another,​ ​even​ ​before​ ​the​ ​sensory​ ​information​ ​is​ ​passed​ ​to​ ​the​ ​motor​ ​system​ ​(Andersen​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​1997; 
Colby,​ ​1998;​ ​Byrne​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​2007).​ ​The​ ​hypothesis​ ​explored​ ​in​ ​this​ ​article​ ​is​ ​that​ ​these​ ​coordinate 
transformations​ ​may​ ​be​ ​avoided​ ​in​ ​the​ ​brain,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​an​ ​alternative​ ​account​ ​could​ ​explain​ ​3D 
perception​ ​of​ ​surface​ ​shape,​ ​object​ ​location​ ​and​ ​scene​ ​layout.  
 
We​ ​focus​ ​particularly​ ​on​ ​the​ ​problem​ ​of​ ​specifying​ ​the​ ​layout​ ​of​ ​a​ ​‘vista​ ​space’​ ​(Meilinger,​ ​2008), 
i.e.​ ​the​ ​scene​ ​that​ ​is​ ​visible​ ​from​ ​one​ ​place​ ​as​ ​an​ ​observer​ ​moves​ ​their​ ​head​ ​and​ ​eyes​ ​around​ ​freely. 
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We​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​solves​ ​this​ ​problem​ ​without​ ​exploiting​ ​either​ ​an​ ​egocentric​ ​or​ ​a 
world-based​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​space.​ ​Instead,​ ​we​ ​propose, 
neurophysiological​ ​mechanisms​ ​of​ ​the​ ​type​ ​that​ ​are​ ​already​ ​recognised​ ​as​ ​underpinning​ ​the​ ​control 
of​ ​movement​ ​are​ ​critical​ ​in​ ​explaining​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​the​ ​3D​ ​environment.​ ​These​ ​mechanisms​ ​were 
originally​ ​proposed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​1960s​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​the​ ​operation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​cerebellum​ ​(Marr​ ​1969;​ ​Albus 
1971,​ ​Schmahmann,​ ​2004).​ ​They​ ​describe​ ​how​ ​a​ ​sensory​ ​state​ ​can​ ​be​ ​‘recognized’​ ​(i.e.​ ​identified 
as​ ​most​ ​similar​ ​to​ ​a​ ​stored​ ​sensory​ ​context)​ ​and​ ​hence​ ​give​ ​rise​ ​to​ ​a​ ​motor​ ​output​ ​associated​ ​with 
that​ ​stored​ ​context. 
 
Similar​ ​mechanisms​ ​to​ ​the​ ​one​ ​we​ ​propose​ ​have​ ​been​ ​suggested​ ​for​ ​the​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​space 
over​ ​a​ ​larger​ ​range​ ​of​ ​movements​ ​(Gillner​ ​and​ ​Mallot​ ​1998;​ ​Franz​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​1998;​ ​Cummins​ ​and 
Newman​ ​2008;​ ​Milford​ ​and​ ​Wyeth​ ​2008)​ ​and​ ​our​ ​broader​ ​aim​ ​is​ ​to​ ​provide​ ​a​ ​common​ ​framework 
to​ ​understand​ ​spatial​ ​perception​ ​over​ ​a​ ​wide​ ​range​ ​of​ ​scales​ ​without​ ​resorting​ ​to​ ​3D​ ​coordinate 
frames​ ​at​ ​any​ ​stage.​ ​However,​ ​in​ ​this​ ​article​ ​we​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​the​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​which 
requires​ ​(i)​ ​saccadic​ ​eye​ ​movements​ ​or​ ​other​ ​rotational​ ​movements​ ​to​ ​allow​ ​the​ ​observer​ ​to​ ​see​ ​the 
entire​ ​scene​ ​around​ ​them​ ​(optic​ ​array)​ ​and​ ​(ii)​ ​relatively​ ​small​ ​translations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​optic​ ​centre 
while​ ​fixating​ ​an​ ​object,​ ​which​ ​includes​ ​lateral​ ​head​ ​movements​ ​and​ ​static​ ​binocular​ ​viewing​ ​of​ ​an 
object.​ ​In​ ​a​ ​static​ ​world,​ ​these​ ​movements,​ ​along​ ​with​ ​hand​ ​movements​ ​and​ ​larger​ ​translations​ ​that 
change​ ​the​ ​optic​ ​array​ ​completely,​ ​cover​ ​a​ ​large​ ​proportion​ ​of​ ​image​ ​changes​ ​that​ ​an​ ​observer​ ​can 
generate.​ ​All​ ​of​ ​these​ ​movements​ ​can​ ​be​ ​described​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​a​ ​graph​ ​of​ ​views,​ ​where​ ​the​ ​nodes 
are​ ​views​ ​and​ ​the​ ​edges​ ​of​ ​the​ ​graph​ ​are​ ​actions,​ ​an​ ​idea​ ​that​ ​is​ ​well​ ​established​ ​in​ ​models​ ​of 
navigation​ ​(Franz​ ​et​ ​al​ ​1998).​ ​We​ ​do​ ​not​ ​restrict​ ​the​ ​discussion​ ​to​ ​vision.​ ​Instead,​ ​all​ ​sensory 
modalities​ ​contribute​ ​to​ ​a​ ​‘sensory​ ​context’​ ​which​ ​is​ ​quite​ ​different​ ​from​ ​bringing​ ​all​ ​modalities 
into​ ​a​ ​common​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​or​ ​reference​ ​frame​ ​as​ ​others​ ​have​ ​suggested​ ​(Jay​ ​and​ ​Sparks 
1987;​ ​Andersen​ ​et​ ​al​ ​1997;​ ​Cohen​ ​and​ ​Andersen​ ​2002).  
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A​ ​second​ ​novel​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​the​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​that​ ​we​ ​suggest​ ​‘motivational’​ ​input​ ​is​ ​included​ ​as​ ​part​ ​of 
a​ ​description​ ​of​ ​the​ ​current​ ​state​ ​(hence​ ​we​ ​talk​ ​of​ ​a​ ​‘sensory+motivational’​ ​state)​ ​and​ ​the​ ​same​ ​is 
true​ ​of​ ​the​ ​stored​ ​contexts.​ ​The​ ​term​ ​‘motivational’​ ​is​ ​intended​ ​to​ ​distinguish​ ​this​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​input 
from​ ​input​ ​with​ ​an​ ​immediately​ ​sensory​ ​source.​ ​Motivational​ ​input​ ​includes​ ​information​ ​about​ ​the 
observer’s​ ​task,​ ​but​ ​it​ ​need​ ​not​ ​be​ ​limited​ ​to​ ​the​ ​observer’s​ ​drives​ ​or​ ​desires. 
 
We​ ​will​ ​set​ ​out​ ​three​ ​reasons​ ​for​ ​accepting​ ​our​ ​proposal.​ ​First​ ​and​ ​foremost,​ ​the​ ​mechanism​ ​we 
propose​ ​can​ ​provide​ ​an​ ​account​ ​for​ ​performance​ ​in​ ​tasks​ ​in​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​that​ ​are​ ​standardly 
explained​ ​by​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​representation​ ​in​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frames.​ ​This​ ​includes​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​the 
slant,​ ​depth​ ​relief​ ​and​ ​relative​ ​distance​ ​of​ ​surfaces​ ​by​ ​a​ ​moving​ ​observer​ ​(see​ ​​A​ ​2½D​ ​sketch 
below).​ ​Second,​ ​while​ ​it​ ​is​ ​an​ ​unresolved​ ​question​ ​as​ ​to​ ​how​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​could​ ​implement​ ​the 
transformations​ ​required​ ​by​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​theory,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​well​ ​established​ ​that​ ​neurons​ ​can 
implement​ ​the​ ​type​ ​of​ ​process​ ​that​ ​is​ ​invoked​ ​in​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​(see​ ​Section​ ​5).​ ​Third,​ ​participants’ 
performance​ ​in​ ​spatial​ ​judgement​ ​tasks​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​their​ ​representations​ ​of​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​cannot​ ​be 
captured​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​a​ ​single,​ ​consistent​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​that​ ​space​ ​(Section 
2).​ ​We​ ​will​ ​contrast​ ​our​ ​approach​ ​with​ ​other​ ​proposals​ ​in​ ​neuroscience,​ ​giving​ ​examples​ ​of 
physiological​ ​and​ ​psychophysical​ ​findings​ ​that​ ​could​ ​discriminate​ ​between​ ​the​ ​rival​ ​hypotheses. 
We​ ​will​ ​also​ ​relate​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​to​ ​philosophical​ ​theories​ ​of​ ​perceptual​ ​experience,​ ​and​ ​consider 
some​ ​philosophical​ ​and​ ​neuroscientific​ ​challenges​ ​(Section​ ​6). 
 
In​ ​the​ ​next​ ​section,​ ​we​ ​introduce​ ​a​ ​distinction​ ​from​ ​the​ ​philosophical​ ​literature​ ​that​ ​enables​ ​us​ ​to 
specify​ ​the​ ​difference​ ​between​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​and​ ​one​ ​based​ ​on​ ​coordinate​ ​frames.​ ​We​ ​also​ ​explain 
our​ ​proposal’s​ ​implications​ ​for​ ​philosophical​ ​theories​ ​of​ ​perceptual​ ​experience.​ ​Then,​ ​in​ ​Section​ ​3, 
we​ ​provide​ ​a​ ​notation​ ​to​ ​define​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​more​ ​formally. 
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2.  3D​ ​representation:​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​or​ ​not? 
Our​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​that​ ​3D​ ​perception​ ​and​ ​action​ ​in​ ​a​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​are​ ​achieved​ ​through​ ​a​ ​process​ ​of 
matching​ ​the​ ​current​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​context​ ​with​ ​stored​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​contexts, 
and​ ​that​ ​in​ ​order​ ​for​ ​perception​ ​and​ ​action​ ​to​ ​be​ ​achieved​ ​in​ ​this​ ​way,​ ​no​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame 
representation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​is​ ​required.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​worth​ ​emphasizing​ ​that​ ​both​ ​conjuncts​ ​of​ ​this 
proposal​ ​are​ ​essential​ ​to​ ​it.​ ​By​ ​itself,​ ​the​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​perception​ ​and​ ​action​ ​are​ ​achieved​ ​through​ ​a 
process​ ​of​ ​matching​ ​current​ ​and​ ​stored​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​contexts​ ​is​ ​extremely​ ​general.​ ​As 
a​ ​result,​ ​by​ ​itself​ ​this​ ​claim​ ​is​ ​consistent​ ​with​ ​representation​ ​in​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frames;​ ​the 
contexts​ ​in​ ​question​ ​could​ ​​be​​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​representations.​ ​Our​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​substantive 
and​ ​falsifiable,​ ​in​ ​that​ ​it​ ​involves​ ​both​ ​the​ ​positive​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​3D​ ​perception​ ​and​ ​action​ ​in​ ​a​ ​vista 
space​ ​are​ ​achieved​ ​through​ ​the​ ​matching​ ​process,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​negative​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​this​ ​does​ ​not 
require​ ​representation​ ​in​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frames. 
 
So​ ​what​ ​is​ ​representation​ ​in​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame?​ ​To​ ​make​ ​this​ ​precise,​ ​we​ ​need​ ​to 
distinguish​ ​between​ ​​the​ ​​content​​ ​and​ ​the​ ​​format​​ ​of​ ​a​ ​representation.​ ​Roughly,​ ​a​ ​representation’s 
content​ ​is​ ​the​ ​information​ ​that​ ​the​ ​representation​ ​makes​ ​available​ ​to​ ​a​ ​system.​ ​The​ ​content​ ​of​ ​a 
representation​ ​may​ ​be​ ​modeled​ ​as​ ​the​ ​possible​ ​state​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world​ ​that​ ​obtains​ ​wherever​ ​the 
representation​ ​is​ ​correct,​ ​for​ ​example​ ​the​ ​presence​ ​of​ ​a​ ​surface​ ​with​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​shape​ ​and​ ​size​ ​at​ ​a 
certain​ ​distance​ ​and​ ​direction​ ​from​ ​the​ ​observer. ​ ​By​ ​contrast,​ ​the​ ​format​ ​of​ ​a​ ​representation​ ​is 1
the​ ​means​ ​by​ ​which​ ​the​ ​vehicle​ ​of​ ​representation​ ​carries​ ​its​ ​content.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​a​ ​map​ ​and​ ​a 
sentence​ ​might​ ​each​ ​have​ ​the​ ​same​ ​content​ ​–​ ​they​ ​might​ ​tell​ ​you​ ​the​ ​same​ ​facts​ ​about​ ​how 
1 ​ ​​Some​ ​philosophers​ ​would​ ​also​ ​include​ ​a​ ​​mode​ ​of​ ​presentation​​ ​of​ ​a​ ​possible​ ​state​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world,​ ​a​ ​further 
aspect​ ​of​ ​the​ ​representation’s​ ​content​ ​which​ ​contributes​ ​to​ ​its​ ​functional​ ​role.​ ​We​ ​try​ ​to​ ​keep​ ​things 
simple​ ​by​ ​working​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​extensional​ ​contents​ ​(i.e.,​ ​contents​ ​which​ ​may​ ​be​ ​modeled​ ​simply​ ​as 
possible​ ​states​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world). 
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objects​ ​are​ ​arranged,​ ​say​ ​–​ ​though​ ​they​ ​represent​ ​that​ ​content​ ​through​ ​different​ ​representational 
formats​ ​(Camp,​ ​2007). 
 
Our​ ​negative​ ​claim​ ​is​ ​that​ ​the​ ​contents​ ​of​ ​perceptual​ ​representations​ ​do​ ​not,​ ​in​ ​general,​ ​include​ ​a 
3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​whole​ ​of​ ​vista​ ​space.​ ​That​ ​is,​ ​the​ ​states​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world​ ​that 
perceptual​ ​processes​ ​represent​ ​do​ ​not,​ ​in​ ​general,​ ​include​ ​certain​ ​spatial​ ​relations:​ ​relations 
between​ ​objects​ ​(or​ ​their​ ​parts)​ ​on​ ​the​ ​one​ ​hand,​ ​and​ ​an​ ​origin​ ​and​ ​three​ ​axes​ ​on​ ​the​ ​other, 
extending​ ​throughout​ ​the​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​around​ ​the​ ​observer. ​ ​Individual​ ​objects​ ​and​ ​subregions​ ​of 2
the​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​are​ ​perceived​ ​as​ ​having​ ​height,​ ​breadth​ ​and​ ​depth,​ ​dimensions​ ​which​ ​may​ ​be 
plotted​ ​against​ ​an​ ​origin​ ​and​ ​three​ ​axes.​ ​But​ ​we​ ​deny​ ​that,​ ​in​ ​general,​ ​perceptual​ ​processes 
represent​ ​the​ ​entire​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​in​ ​this​ ​way,​ ​with​ ​spatial​ ​relations​ ​among​ ​all​ ​locations​ ​in​ ​the​ ​space 
represented​ ​in​ ​a​ ​way​ ​that​ ​may​ ​be​ ​plotted​ ​against​ ​a​ ​single​ ​origin​ ​and​ ​three​ ​axes.​ ​We​ ​accept​ ​that,​ ​for 
some​ ​very​ ​specific​ ​tasks,​ ​representations​ ​of​ ​these​ ​relations​ ​throughout​ ​a​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​might​ ​be 
constructed.​ ​But​ ​we​ ​deny​ ​that​ ​perception​ ​and​ ​action​ ​in​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​world​ ​in​ ​general​ ​rely​ ​on​ ​that 
construction.​ ​Our​ ​alternative​ ​can​ ​also​ ​be​ ​contrasted​ ​with​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​representation​ ​in 
that​ ​the​ ​latter,​ ​but​ ​not​ ​the​ ​former,​ ​is​ ​an​ ​essentially​ ​metric​ ​form​ ​of​ ​representation​ ​(see​ ​Section​ ​4). 
 
Though​ ​our​ ​negative​ ​claim​ ​concerns​ ​the​ ​contents​ ​of​ ​perceptual​ ​representation,​ ​it​ ​might​ ​be​ ​falsified 
by​ ​findings​ ​about​ ​the​ ​format​ ​of​ ​perceptual​ ​representation:​ ​if​ ​perceptual​ ​representations​ ​had​ ​a 
format​ ​like​ ​that​ ​of​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​model​ ​of​ ​a​ ​vista​ ​space,​ ​this​ ​would​ ​be​ ​strong​ ​evidence​ ​that​ ​these 
representations​ ​exploit​ ​that​ ​format​ ​to​ ​carry​ ​contents​ ​that​ ​are​ ​expressible​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​3D​ ​coordinate 
frames​ ​(see​ ​Section​ ​5).​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​one​ ​way​ ​to​ ​describe​ ​the​ ​receptive​ ​fields​ ​of​ ​disparity​ ​tuned 
neurons​ ​in​ ​V1​ ​is​ ​that​ ​each​ ​cell​ ​can​ ​be​ ​mapped​ ​to​ ​a​ ​voxel​ ​in​ ​a​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​defined​ ​by​ ​three 
axes,​ ​where​ ​the​ ​origin​ ​lies​ ​at​ ​the​ ​fixation​ ​point​ ​and​ ​variation​ ​along​ ​the​ ​horizontal​ ​and​ ​vertical​ ​axes 
2 ​ ​If​ ​a​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​system​ ​did​ ​represent​ ​the​ ​entire​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​in​ ​this​ ​way,​ ​it​ ​might​ ​be​ ​unspecific​ ​or 
silent​ ​about​ ​what​ ​is​ ​present​ ​at​ ​some​ ​coordinates​ ​in​ ​the​ ​vista​ ​space.​ ​So​ ​our​ ​negative​ ​claim​ ​is​ ​not​ ​supported 
merely​ ​by​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​some​ ​regions​ ​of​ ​a​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​are​ ​occluded. 
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is​ ​determined​ ​by​ ​a​ ​cell’s​ ​spatial​ ​location​ ​in​ ​the​ ​cortex​ ​while​ ​variation​ ​along​ ​the​ ​depth​ ​axis​ ​is 
determined​ ​by​ ​a​ ​cell’s​ ​disparity​ ​sensitivity​ ​(Prince​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​2002).​ ​This​ ​format​ ​in​ ​V1​ ​does​ ​not 
undermine​ ​our​ ​hypothesis,​ ​since​ ​the​ ​V1​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​only​ ​applies​ ​to​ ​a​ ​subregion​ ​of​ ​vista 
space​ ​and​ ​the​ ​frame​ ​moves​ ​with​ ​the​ ​eye.​ ​​ ​But​ ​if​ ​a​ ​parallel​ ​format​ ​were​ ​found​ ​in​ ​brain​ ​areas​ ​that 
encode​ ​head-centred​ ​or​ ​world-centred​ ​frames,​ ​especially​ ​if​ ​it​ ​could​ ​be​ ​shown​ ​that​ ​these​ ​formats 
are​ ​inherited​ ​or​ ​computed​ ​on​ ​the​ ​basis​ ​of​ ​the​ ​V1​ ​coordinate​ ​frame,​ ​that​ ​would​ ​be​ ​strong​ ​evidence 
against​ ​our​ ​hypothesis​ ​(see​ ​Section​ ​6.3). 
 
Philosophical​ ​work​ ​on​ ​spatial​ ​perception​ ​often​ ​assumes​ ​that​ ​the​ ​contents​ ​of​ ​perceptual 
representations​ ​include​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frames​ ​(see​ ​e.g.​ ​the​ ​essays​ ​in​ ​Eilan,​ ​McCarthy​ ​and​ ​Brewer, 
1993).​ ​Here​ ​is​ ​an​ ​influential​ ​example: 
 
I​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​one​ ​basic​ ​form​ ​of​ ​representational​ ​content​ ​should​ ​be​ ​individuated​ ​by 
specifying​ ​which​ ​ways​ ​of​ ​filling​ ​out​ ​the​ ​space​ ​around​ ​the​ ​perceiver​ ​are​ ​consistent​ ​with​ ​the 
representation’s​ ​content​ ​being​ ​correct.​ ​The​ ​idea​ ​is​ ​that​ ​the​ ​content​ ​involves​ ​a​ ​certain 
spatial​ ​​type.​​ ​…​ ​There​ ​are​ ​two​ ​steps​ ​we​ ​have​ ​to​ ​take​ ​if​ ​we​ ​are​ ​to​ ​specify​ ​fully​ ​one​ ​of​ ​these 
spatial​ ​types.​ ​The​ ​first​ ​step​ ​is​ ​to​ ​fix​ ​an​ ​origin​ ​and​ ​axes.​ ​…​ ​[F]or​ ​instance,​ ​one​ ​kind​ ​of 
origin​ ​is​ ​given​ ​by​ ​the​ ​property​ ​of​ ​being​ ​the​ ​center​ ​of​ ​the​ ​chest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​body,​ ​with​ ​the 
three​ ​axes​ ​given​ ​by​ ​the​ ​directions​ ​back/front,​ ​left/right,​ ​and​ ​up/down​ ​with​ ​respect​ ​to​ ​that 
center.​ ​…​ ​Having​ ​fixed​ ​origin​ ​and​ ​axes,​ ​we​ ​need​ ​to​ ​take​ ​the​ ​second​ ​step​ ​in​ ​determining 




Peacocke​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​the​ ​spatial​ ​contents​ ​of​ ​perception​ ​take​ ​the​ ​form​ ​of​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame 
representation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​around​ ​an​ ​observer.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​the​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​representation​ ​which​ ​we 
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deny​ ​is​ ​required​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​perception​ ​and​ ​action​ ​in​ ​a​ ​vista​ ​space. 
 
Like​ ​much​ ​of​ ​the​ ​philosophical​ ​literature,​ ​Peacocke​ ​appeals​ ​to​ ​perceptual​ ​representations​ ​in​ ​order 
to​ ​capture​ ​the​ ​phenomenology​ ​of​ ​perceptual​ ​experience;​ ​his​ ​core​ ​claim​ ​about​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame 
representation​ ​is​ ​that​ ​‘the​ ​appropriate​ ​set​ ​of​ ​labeled​ ​axes​ ​captures​ ​distinctions​ ​in​ ​the 
phenomenology​ ​of​ ​experience’​ ​(63).​ ​In​ ​what​ ​follows​ ​we​ ​do​ ​not​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​describing 
phenomenology.​ ​Instead​ ​we​ ​explain​ ​the​ ​perceptual​ ​achievements​ ​revealed​ ​by​ ​observers’​ ​reports​ ​of 
the​ ​layout​ ​of​ ​a​ ​scene,​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​a​ ​system​ ​of​ ​representations​ ​in​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​that​ ​does​ ​not​ ​include​ ​3D 
coordinate​ ​frames.​ ​Nonetheless,​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​undermines​ ​Peacocke’s​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​the 
phenomenology​ ​of​ ​perceptual​ ​experience​ ​should​ ​be​ ​characterized​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​3D​ ​coordinate 
frames.​ ​Observers’​ ​reports​ ​about​ ​a​ ​scene​ ​are​ ​a​ ​key​ ​empirical​ ​measure​ ​of​ ​phenomenology​ ​or 
conscious​ ​experience​ ​(Weiskrantz​ ​1997;​ ​Deheane​ ​and​ ​Changeux​ ​2004),​ ​and​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​that 
the​ ​system​ ​of​ ​representations​ ​which​ ​best​ ​explains​ ​these​ ​reports​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a​ ​system​ ​of​ ​3D​ ​coordinate 
frame​ ​representations. 
 
Our​ ​explanation​ ​of​ ​participants’​ ​reports​ ​is​ ​more​ ​powerful​ ​than​ ​an​ ​explanation​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​3D 
coordinate​ ​frames,​ ​because​ ​some​ ​reports​ ​which​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​explains​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​explained​ ​by​ ​any 
‘way​ ​of​ ​filling​ ​out​ ​space’​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​three​ ​axes​ ​and​ ​an​ ​origin.​ ​For​ ​example​ ​participants​ ​in 
Glennerster’s​ ​lab​ ​were​ ​presented​ ​with​ ​an​ ​expanding​ ​virtual​ ​scene,​ ​and​ ​made​ ​pairwise​ ​comparisons 
of​ ​the​ ​distances​ ​to​ ​objects.​ ​Although​ ​the​ ​pairwise​ ​comparisons​ ​were​ ​precise​ ​(i.e.​ ​highly 
repeatable),​ ​​there​ ​was​ ​no​ ​consistent​ ​depth​ ​ordering​ ​of​ ​the​ ​objects​ ​that​ ​could​ ​explain​ ​this 
performance​ ​(e.g.​ ​A>B>D​ ​yet​ ​also​ ​A<C<D).​ ​No​ ​single​ ​3D-coordinate​ ​plotting​ ​of​ ​the​ ​objects’ 
locations​ ​is​ ​consistent​ ​with​ ​this​ ​form​ ​of​ ​successful​ ​spatial​ ​perception​ ​(Svarverud​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2012),​ ​a 
conclusion​ ​others​ ​have​ ​proposed​ ​on​ ​the​ ​basis​ ​of​ ​similar​ ​apparently​ ​inconsistent​ ​psychophysical 
evidence​ ​(Koenderink​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​2002;​ ​Smeets​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​2009,​ ​see​ ​Section​ ​5).​ ​Our​ ​explanation​ ​of 
participants’​ ​reports​ ​is​ ​also​ ​simpler​ ​​than​ ​an​ ​explanation​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frames,​ ​because 
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in​ ​contrast​ ​with​ ​the​ ​transformations​ ​required​ ​by​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​theory,​ ​the​ ​type​ ​of​ ​process 
we​ ​propose​ ​is​ ​one​ ​that​ ​we​ ​know​ ​neurons​ ​can​ ​implement​ ​(see​ ​Section​ ​5). 
 
These​ ​advantages​ ​turn​ ​on​ ​the​ ​positive​ ​part​ ​of​ ​our​ ​proposal,​ ​to​ ​which​ ​we​ ​turn​ ​next.​ ​Our​ ​positive 
claim​ ​is​ ​that​ ​perception​ ​and​ ​action​ ​are​ ​achieved​ ​through​ ​a​ ​process​ ​of​ ​matching​ ​the​ ​current 
sensory+motivational​ ​context​ ​with​ ​a​ ​very​ ​long​ ​list​ ​of​ ​stored​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​contexts.​ ​The 
next​ ​section​ ​specifies​ ​this​ ​more​ ​formally.​ ​The​ ​consequence​ ​of​ ​picking​ ​one​ ​context​ ​is​ ​an​ ​output 
(which​ ​usually​ ​results​ ​in​ ​a​ ​motor​ ​output)​ ​and​ ​hence​ ​a​ ​new​ ​context,​ ​a​ ​loop​ ​that​ ​is​ ​entirely​ ​familiar 
in​ ​the​ ​domain​ ​of​ ​motor​ ​control.​ ​We​ ​propose​ ​that​ ​this​ ​step​ ​is​ ​a​ ​fundamental​ ​one​ ​in​ ​the 
representation​ ​of​ ​3D​ ​shape​ ​and​ ​layout,​ ​as​ ​we​ ​illustrate​ ​in​ ​Section​ ​4. 
3.  Recognising​ ​a​ ​stored​ ​context 
We​ ​consider​ ​every​ ​neural​ ​firing​ ​rate​ ​in​ ​the​ ​nervous​ ​system​ ​that​ ​might​ ​contribute​ ​to​ ​the​ ​next​ ​action 
as​ ​an​ ​element​ ​in​ ​a​ ​long​ ​list​ ​or​ ​vector,​ ​ ,​ ​with​ ​length​ ​ .​ ​This​ ​defines​ ​the​ ​current​ ​context.​ ​Ther→ n  
nervous​ ​system​ ​stores​ ​synaptic​ ​weights​ ​in​ ​such​ ​a​ ​way​ ​that​ ​they​ ​can​ ​be​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​the​ ​firing​ ​rates 
listed​ ​in​ ​ ​ ​.​ ​The​ ​current​ ​context,​ ​ ,​ ​is​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​a​ ​large​ ​number​ ​of​ ​stored​ ​contexts,​ ​where​ ​eachr→ r→  
stored​ ​context​ ​is​ ​a​ ​long​ ​list​ ​of​ ​synaptic​ ​weights,​ ​also​ ​of​ ​length​ ​​n​.​ ​In​ ​Marr’s​ ​model​ ​of​ ​the 
cerebellum​ ​(Marr,​ ​1969),​ ​each​ ​of​ ​these​ ​stored​ ​contexts​ ​corresponded​ ​to​ ​the​ ​synaptic​ ​weights​ ​of​ ​a 
Purkinje​ ​cell​ ​but​ ​the​ ​idea​ ​of​ ​comparing​ ​an​ ​input​ ​vector​ ​of​ ​firing​ ​rates​ ​to​ ​a​ ​stored​ ​vector​ ​of​ ​synaptic 
weights​ ​is​ ​a​ ​general​ ​principle​ ​of​ ​neural​ ​computation​ ​that​ ​is​ ​applicable​ ​from​ ​the​ ​level​ ​of​ ​a​ ​single 
neurons​ ​up​ ​to​ ​very​ ​large​ ​sets​ ​of​ ​neurons​ ​(e.g.​ ​McCulloch​ ​and​ ​Pitts,​ ​1943;​ ​Rolls​ ​and​ ​Treves,​ ​1998). 
If​ ​there​ ​are​ ​​m​​ ​stored​ ​contexts​ ​then​ ​these​ ​synaptic​ ​weights​ ​form​ ​an​ ​​m​​ ​by​ ​​n​ ​ ​matrix,​ ​ ,​ ​with​ ​eachW  
row​ ​constituting​ ​one​ ​stored​ ​context,​ ​  ​ ​For​ ​the​ ​sake​ ​of​ ​notational​ ​simplicity​ ​(and​ ​following.w(i, )*  
Marr​ ​(1969)),​ ​we​ ​assume​ ​that​ ​the​ ​magnitude​ ​of​ ​ ​ ​is​ ​the​ ​same​ ​as​ ​that​ ​of​ ​each​ ​stored​ ​context:r→  
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​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​Eq​ ​(1)‖r‖ w ‖, ∀i 1, , ] → = ‖ (i, )*  = [ … m  
 
For​ ​example,​ ​if​ ​each​ ​neuron​ ​contributing​ ​to​ ​ ​ ​is​ ​either​ ​firing​ ​or​ ​not​ ​(1​ ​or​ ​0)​ ​and​ ​each​ ​synapticr→  
weight​ ​is​ ​either​ ​‘on’​ ​or​ ​‘off’​ ​(1​ ​or​ ​0),​ ​this​ ​is​ ​equivalent​ ​to​ ​assuming​ ​that​ ​the​ ​proportion​ ​of​ ​neurons 
firing​ ​at​ ​any​ ​one​ ​time​ ​is​ ​constant​ ​(​k​)​ ​and​ ​equal​ ​to​ ​the​ ​proportion​ ​of​ ​synapses​ ​that​ ​are​ ​‘on’​ ​in​ ​each 
stored​ ​context,​ ​ ​ ​There​ ​is​ ​evidence​ ​that​ ​this​ ​proportion​ ​might​ ​be​ ​quite​ ​low​ ​(Attwell​ ​and.w(i, )*  
Laughlin,​ ​2001). 
 
The​ ​process​ ​of​ ​comparing​ ​ ​ ​(​n​ ​​by​ ​1)​ ​to​ ​the​ ​stored​ ​contexts,​​ ​ (​m​ ​​by​ ​​n​),​ ​is​ ​simply:r→ W  
 
​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​Eq​ ​(2)(W r)k = argmaxi →  
 
 
where​ ​the​ ​function   returns​ ​the​ ​index​ ​of​ ​the​ ​maximum​ ​value​ ​in​ ​ ,​ ​i.e.   is​ ​the​ ​index(x)argmaxi → x→ k  
to   that​ ​gives​ ​the​ ​maximum​ ​correlation​ ​between   and  ​ ​for​ ​any  ​ ​and​ ​henceW r→ w(i, )* 1, , ]i = [ … m  
is​ ​the​ ​‘recognised​ ​context’.​ ​Geometrically,​ ​this​ ​amounts​ ​to​ ​searching​ ​on​ ​an​ ​ -dimensionalw(k, )* n  
sphere​ ​for​ ​the​ ​context,​ ​ ,​ ​that​ ​is​ ​closest​ ​to​ ​ ​ ​(in​ ​the​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​having​ ​smallest​ ​angle​ ​betweenw(i, )* r
→  
them).​ ​Each​ ​context,​ ​ ,​ ​is​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​a​ ​predetermined​ ​output​ ​(in​ ​the​ ​simple​ ​case,​ ​a​ ​motorw(i, )*  
output).​ ​In​ ​this​ ​sense,​ ​the​ ​list​ ​of​ ​stored​ ​contexts​ ​can​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​to​ ​be​ ​a​ ​list​ ​of​ ​‘reflexes’. 
The​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​neutral​ ​about​ ​the​ ​location​ ​in​ ​the​ ​nervous​ ​system​ ​of​ ​the​ ​relevant​ ​synaptic​ ​weights, 




Figure​ ​1.​ ​Many​ ​stored​ ​contexts​ ​and​ ​one​ ​current​ ​context.​​ ​The​ ​sphere​ ​shown​ ​here​ ​serves​ ​to 
represent​ ​a​ ​high-dimensional​ ​sphere​ ​where​ ​​m​​ ​stored​ ​contexts​ ​(components​ ​of​ ​matrix​ ​ )​ ​areW  
illustrated​ ​by​ ​the​ ​red​ ​dots​ ​and​ ​one​ ​current​ ​state,​ ​ ,​ ​as​ ​a​ ​yellow​ ​dot​ ​(i.e.​ ​the​ ​vector​ ​representing​ ​ther→  
current​ ​state​ ​has​ ​the​ ​same​ ​magnitude​ ​and​ ​dimensionality​ ​as​ ​the​ ​stored​ ​contexts).​ ​The​ ​dashed​ ​line 
illustrates​ ​that​ ​one​ ​of​ ​the​ ​stored​ ​contexts​ ​is​ ​closest​ ​to​ ​the​ ​current​ ​state​ ​and​ ​hence​ ​this​ ​context 
would​ ​determine​ ​the​ ​output​ ​(e.g.​ ​motor​ ​output).​ ​​ ​The​ ​diagram​ ​on​ ​the​ ​right​ ​is​ ​a​ ​Voronoi​ ​tessellation 
of​ ​a​ ​2D​ ​space​ ​illustrating​ ​the​ ​same​ ​idea.​ ​Each​ ​red​ ​dot​ ​is​ ​a​ ​‘seed’​ ​that​ ​generates​ ​a​ ​Voronoi​ ​region 
bounded​ ​by​ ​the​ ​blue​ ​lines. 
 
The​ ​current​ ​context,​ ​ ,​ ​will​ ​always​ ​be​ ​closest​ ​to​ ​one​ ​stored​ ​context​ ​ .​ ​The​ ​surface​ ​of​ ​the​ ​r→ w(i, )* n
-dimensional​ ​sphere​ ​of​ ​contexts​ ​can​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​as​ ​a​ ​Voronoi​ ​tessellation​ ​where​ ​each​ ​stored 
context​ ​is​ ​a​ ​‘seed’​ ​in​ ​the​ ​tessellation​ ​(Aurenhammer​ ​1991).​ ​The​ ​‘recognised​ ​context’,​ ​ ,​ ​isw(k, )*  
associated​ ​with​ ​an​ ​output,​ ​ ,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​above​ ​examples​ ​that​ ​normally​ ​leads​ ​to​ ​a​ ​motor​ ​movement.​ ​Ifo→  
​ ​leads​ ​to​ ​movement​ ​in​ ​the​ ​world,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​usually​ ​a​ ​new​ ​sensory​ ​input,​ ​a​ ​new​ ​motivational​ ​inputo→  
and​ ​hence​ ​a​ ​new​ ​input​ ​vector,​ ​ .​ ​Labels​ ​for​ ​ ​ ​in​ ​each​ ​of​ ​these​ ​epochs​ ​could​ ​be​ ​ j​ ​​ ​​and​​ ​ j+1​,​ ​but​ ​wer→ r→ r→  r→  
do​ ​not​ ​refer​ ​to​ ​them​ ​in​ ​the​ ​rest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​paper​ ​and​ ​simply​ ​discuss​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​ ​ ​changes,​ ​e.g.​ ​ther→  
‘path​ ​of​ ​ ​ ​through​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​space’,​ ​where​ ​ ∈​​ ​​ℝ​n​.​ ​Finally,​ ​there​ ​must​ ​be​ ​ar→ r→  
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mechanism​ ​to​ ​compare​ ​the​ ​new​ ​value​ ​of​ ​ ​ ​with​ ​the​ ​expected​ ​value,​ ​sometimes​ ​called​ ​a​ ​‘motorr→  
error’​ ​(Waitzman​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​1988;​ ​Porrill​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​2004).​ ​We​ ​assume​ ​that​ ​in​ ​many​ ​cases​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​‘virtual’ 
output,​ ​with​ ​no​ ​overt​ ​motor​ ​response,​ ​and​ ​a​ ​movement​ ​of​ ​ ​ ​as​ ​a​ ​result​ ​but​ ​considering​ ​how​ ​thatr→  
might​ ​be​ ​achieved​ ​is​ ​beyond​ ​the​ ​scope​ ​of​ ​this​ ​paper.​ ​Also,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​examples​ ​that​ ​follow​ ​(e.g. 
considering​ ​judgements​ ​of​ ​slant,​ ​depth,​ ​distance)​ ​we​ ​assume​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​only​ ​one​ ​Voronoi​ ​region 
determining​ ​the​ ​output​ ​(motor​ ​or​ ​otherwise)​ ​at​ ​any​ ​moment.​ ​We​ ​do​ ​not​ ​exclude​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​that 
people​ ​may​ ​be​ ​engaged​ ​in​ ​more​ ​than​ ​one​ ​task​ ​simultaneously​ ​(e.g.​ ​walking​ ​and​ ​humming)​ ​and​ ​that 
this​ ​would​ ​be​ ​described​ ​better​ ​by​ ​more​ ​than​ ​one​ ​input​ ​vector​ ​and​ ​more​ ​than​ ​one​ ​Voronoi​ ​region.  
We​ ​describe​ ​the​ ​input​ ​vector​ ​to​ ​the​ ​decision​ ​step,​ ​ ,​ ​as​ ​a​ ​‘sensory+motivational​ ​context’.​ ​By​ ​thisr→  
we​ ​mean​ ​that​ ​ ​ ​is​ ​a​ ​concatenation​ ​of​ ​a​ ​vector​ ​of​ ​sensory​ ​inputs​ ​(including​ ​different​ ​sensoryr→  
domains),​ ​ ,​ ​and​ ​a​ ​vector​ ​of​ ​motivational​ ​inputs,​ ​ ,​ ​i.e.s→ t→   
​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​​ ​Eq​ ​(3)r s || t  → =  → →  
where​ ​ ​ ​​∈​​ ​​ℝ​ns​,​ ​ ​ ​​∈​​ ​​ℝ​nt​,​ ​​ ​ ∈​​ ​​ℝ​n​​ ​and,​ ​since​ ​ ​ ​and​ ​ ​ ​each​ ​add​ ​independent​ ​dimensions​ ​to​ ​ ,​ ​​ ​i.e.s→ t→ r→ s→ t→ r→  
n​​ ​=​ ​​ns​​ ​+​ ​​nt​. 
4.  A​ ​2½D​ ​sketch 
Marr​ ​and​ ​Nishihara​ ​(1978)​ ​put​ ​forward​ ​a​ ​hypothesis​ ​about​ ​how​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​might​ ​represent​ ​depth 
relationships​ ​in​ ​a​ ​scene​ ​despite​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​the​ ​observer​ ​moves​ ​around.​ ​They​ ​introduced​ ​the​ ​term 
a​ ​‘2½D​ ​sketch’,​ ​a​ ​representation​ ​that​ ​was​ ​supposed​ ​to​ ​remain​ ​unaffected​ ​by​ ​vergence​ ​movements 
of​ ​the​ ​eyes.​ ​Neither​ ​Marr​ ​and​ ​Nishihara​ ​nor​ ​Marr​ ​in​ ​his​ ​book​ ​(Marr​ ​1982)​ ​were​ ​very​ ​clear​ ​on​ ​the 
what​ ​the​ ​coordinates​ ​of​ ​this​ ​sketch​ ​might​ ​be​ ​and​ ​it​ ​has​ ​remained​ ​a​ ​tricky​ ​issue​ ​to​ ​define​ ​a​ ​useful 
coordinate​ ​system​ ​other​ ​than​ ​an​ ​image-based​ ​(retinal)​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​or​ ​a​ ​3D,​ ​world-based 
frame​ ​which​ ​are​ ​the​ ​principal​ ​coordinate​ ​frames​ ​used​ ​in​ ​computer​ ​vision​ ​(Hartley​ ​and​ ​Zisserman 
2003;​ ​Davison​ ​2003).​ ​Here,​ ​we​ ​describe​ ​an​ ​alternative​ ​version​ ​of​ ​a​ ​‘2½D​ ​sketch’​ ​based​ ​on​ ​a​ ​graph 
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of​ ​views​ ​connected​ ​by​ ​actions. 
 
4.1 Looking​ ​around 
If​ ​the​ ​eye​ ​(or​ ​a​ ​camera)​ ​were​ ​unable​ ​to​ ​translate​ ​in​ ​space​ ​and​ ​could​ ​only​ ​rotate​ ​about​ ​its​ ​optic 
centre​ ​(which​ ​is​ ​not​ ​quite​ ​true​ ​of​ ​the​ ​eye,​ ​but​ ​approximately​ ​so),​ ​then​ ​there​ ​would​ ​be​ ​a​ ​certain 
number​ ​of​ ​objects​ ​that​ ​it​ ​could​ ​fixate​ ​and​ ​a​ ​greater​ ​number​ ​of​ ​rotations​ ​(the​ ​square​ ​of​ ​the​ ​number 
of​ ​objects)​ ​that​ ​would​ ​take​ ​the​ ​eye​ ​from​ ​fixating​ ​one​ ​object​ ​to​ ​another.​ ​In​ ​most​ ​cases,​ ​these 
rotations​ ​will​ ​be​ ​saccades​ ​but​ ​large​ ​rotations​ ​of​ ​gaze​ ​may​ ​also​ ​involve​ ​head​ ​movements​ ​(and​ ​in​ ​the 
superior​ ​colliculus,​ ​these​ ​are​ ​often​ ​combined​ ​together​ ​so​ ​that​ ​the​ ​gaze​ ​change​ ​is​ ​the​ ​important 
parameter​ ​encoded,​ ​Corneil​ ​et​ ​al​ ​2002).​ ​In​ ​a​ ​graph​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​this​ ​situation,​ ​each​ ​node 
would​ ​correspond​ ​to​ ​a​ ​context​ ​that​ ​includes​ ​(i)​ ​sensory​ ​data​ ​that​ ​helps​ ​identify​ ​the​ ​fixated​ ​object 
and​ ​(ii)​ ​a​ ​signal​ ​that​ ​specifies​ ​the​ ​next​ ​desired​ ​fixation​ ​point.​ ​Together,​ ​these​ ​are​ ​sufficient​ ​to 
specify​ ​the​ ​rotation​ ​of​ ​gaze​ ​(e.g.​ ​saccade)​ ​required​ ​to​ ​fixate​ ​the​ ​new​ ​target. 
 
As​ ​we​ ​discussed​ ​above​ ​(Section​ ​3),​ ​these​ ​two​ ​elements​ ​(sensory​ ​data​ ​and​ ​a​ ​signal​ ​about​ ​the​ ​next 
goal)​ ​could​ ​be​ ​concatenated​ ​into​ ​a​ ​long​ ​list​ ​or​ ​vector​ ​and​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​a​ ​large​ ​number​ ​of​ ​stored 
contexts​ ​that​ ​are​ ​in​ ​the​ ​same​ ​format​ ​(i.e.​ ​vectors​ ​in​ ​the​ ​same​ ​space).​ ​This​ ​type​ ​of​ ​representation​ ​is 
a​ ​graph​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​a​ ​reconstruction​ ​in​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​coordinate-frame:​ ​the​ ​nodes​ ​are​ ​contexts​ ​and​ ​the​ ​edges 
joining​ ​the​ ​nodes​ ​are​ ​actions.  
 
A​ ​practical​ ​issue​ ​concerns​ ​the​ ​number​ ​of​ ​stored​ ​contexts​ ​that​ ​would​ ​be​ ​required​ ​to​ ​make​ ​this​ ​work. 
Eye​ ​movement​ ​experiments​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​humans​ ​store​ ​features​ ​in​ ​groups,​ ​which​ ​allows​ ​a 
hierarchical,​ ​coarse-to-fine​ ​strategy​ ​to​ ​be​ ​used​ ​to​ ​navigate​ ​between​ ​features​ ​and​ ​a​ ​consequent 




4.2  Moving​ ​around​ ​an​ ​object 
The​ ​idea​ ​that​ ​object​ ​recognition​ ​in​ ​humans​ ​and​ ​animals​ ​is​ ​based​ ​on​ ​sets​ ​of​ ​2-D​ ​views​ ​rather​ ​than 
3-D​ ​internal​ ​models​ ​has​ ​a​ ​long​ ​history​ ​(​Bülthoff​ ​and​ ​Edelman​ ​1992;​ ​Tarr​ ​and​ ​Bülthoff​ ​1998​)​ ​and 
has​ ​been​ ​bolstered​ ​by​ ​recent​ ​comparisons​ ​between​ ​object​ ​recognition​ ​in​ ​infero-temporal​ ​cortex 
and​ ​in​ ​deep​ ​neural​ ​networks​ ​(DiCarlo​ ​et​ ​al​ ​2012).​ ​Representing​ ​the​ ​3D​ ​structure​ ​of​ ​an​ ​object​ ​rather 
than​ ​simply​ ​recognizing​ ​it​ ​in​ ​different​ ​poses​ ​involves​ ​more​ ​than​ ​a​ ​large​ ​store​ ​of​ ​2D​ ​views.​ ​For​ ​a 
graph​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​object​ ​shape,​ ​just​ ​as​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​gaze​ ​shifts​ ​in​ ​the​ ​previous​ ​section,​ ​the 
different​ ​views​ ​of​ ​the​ ​object​ ​form​ ​different​ ​nodes​ ​of​ ​the​ ​graph​ ​and​ ​these​ ​nodes​ ​are​ ​connected​ ​by 
edges:​ ​the​ ​actions​ ​that​ ​would​ ​turn​ ​one​ ​view​ ​into​ ​another.​ ​This​ ​time,​ ​assuming​ ​a​ ​static​ ​world​ ​and​ ​a 
moving​ ​observer,​ ​which​ ​is​ ​our​ ​assumption​ ​throughout​ ​this​ ​section​ ​on​ ​a​ ​2½D​ ​sketch,​ ​the​ ​actions 
are​ ​head​ ​movements.​ ​Figure​ ​2​ ​shows​ ​some​ ​of​ ​the​ ​different​ ​views​ ​of​ ​a​ ​cube​ ​that​ ​can​ ​be​ ​obtained​ ​by 
a​ ​monocular​ ​observer​ ​moving​ ​in​ ​different​ ​directions​ ​while​ ​maintaining​ ​gaze​ ​on​ ​the​ ​object​ ​or,​ ​in 
the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​the​ ​highlighted​ ​pair​ ​of​ ​views,​ ​a​ ​binocular​ ​observer​ ​viewing​ ​the​ ​same​ ​cube.​ ​A​ ​sphere, 
on​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand​ ​will​ ​always​ ​project​ ​a​ ​circular​ ​image.​ ​A​ ​planar​ ​slanted​ ​surface​ ​will​ ​project​ ​to​ ​an 
image​ ​that​ ​deforms​ ​in​ ​characteristic​ ​ways.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​latter​ ​case,​ ​the​ ​same​ ​images​ ​(nodes​ ​of​ ​the​ ​graph) 
connected​ ​by​ ​smaller​ ​head​ ​movements​ ​(edges)​ ​would​ ​be​ ​caused​ ​by,​ ​and​ ​would​ ​lead​ ​to​ ​the 




Figure​ ​2.​ ​Views​ ​connected​ ​by​ ​actions.​​ ​a)​ ​The​ ​left​ ​and​ ​right​ ​eye’s​ ​view​ ​of​ ​a​ ​cube​ ​are​ ​circled​ ​above 
and​ ​shown​ ​in​ ​plan​ ​view​ ​below.​ ​Also​ ​shown​ ​are​ ​many​ ​other​ ​views​ ​that​ ​a​ ​monocular​ ​observer​ ​would 
obtain​ ​if​ ​they​ ​moved​ ​their​ ​head​ ​while​ ​fixating​ ​the​ ​cube.​ ​​ ​b)​ ​Rotations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​eye​ ​(saccades)​ ​also 
give​ ​rise​ ​to​ ​a​ ​set​ ​of​ ​images​ ​that​ ​are​ ​related​ ​to​ ​one​ ​another​ ​in​ ​a​ ​consistent​ ​way​ ​(here,​ ​shown​ ​on​ ​a 
single​ ​sphere).​ ​c)​ ​For​ ​both​ ​a)​ ​and​ ​b)​ ​the​ ​images​ ​can​ ​be​ ​described​ ​as​ ​a​ ​graph​ ​of​ ​views​ ​connected 
by​ ​actions.​ ​b)​ ​is​ ​reproduced​ ​with​ ​permission​ ​from​ ​Glennerster​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​2001.​ ​Figure​ ​is​ ​adapted​ ​from 
Glennerster​ ​(2016). 
 
Our​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​that​ ​the​ ​observer’s​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​a​ ​cube​ ​like​ ​the​ ​one​ ​shown​ ​in​ ​Figure​ ​2​ ​involves 
nothing​ ​more​ ​than​ ​movement​ ​of​ ​ ​ ​between​ ​a​ ​set​ ​of​ ​Voronoi​ ​regions​ ​that​ ​are​ ​appropriate,​ ​so​ ​thatr→  
for​ ​every​ ​movement​ ​the​ ​observer​ ​makes​ ​ ​ ​lands​ ​up​ ​in​ ​the​ ​appropriate​ ​Voronoi​ ​region​ ​(i.e.​ ​ther→  
sensory​ ​information​ ​that​ ​observer​ ​receives​ ​matches​ ​the​ ​expectation​ ​for​ ​that​ ​movement).​ ​For 
example,​ ​if​ ​an​ ​observer​ ​received​ ​all​ ​the​ ​images​ ​shown​ ​in​ ​a)​ ​in​ ​a​ ​random​ ​order​ ​as​ ​they​ ​moved​ ​their 
head​ ​then​ ​they​ ​would​ ​not​ ​perceive​ ​a​ ​cube​ ​but​ ​if​ ​they​ ​received​ ​them​ ​in​ ​a​ ​way​ ​that​ ​was​ ​consistent 
with​ ​viewing​ ​a​ ​real​ ​cube​ ​as​ ​they​ ​moved​ ​then​ ​they​ ​would​ ​perceive​ ​a​ ​cube.​ ​However,​ ​the​ ​prediction 
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of​ ​the​ ​sensory​ ​consequences​ ​does​ ​not​ ​have​ ​to​ ​be​ ​entirely​ ​accurate​ ​to​ ​perceive​ ​a​ ​static​ ​3D​ ​object. 
For​ ​one​ ​thing,​ ​the​ ​degree​ ​of​ ​tolerance​ ​to​ ​error​ ​may​ ​depend​ ​on​ ​the​ ​task,​ ​as​ ​we​ ​discuss​ ​in​ ​Section​ ​5. 
 
4.3 Object​ ​distance 
Finally,​ ​to​ ​include​ ​all​ ​the​ ​elements​ ​Marr​ ​and​ ​Nishihara​ ​(1978)​ ​envisaged​ ​in​ ​a​ ​2½D​ ​sketch,​ ​the 
representation​ ​must​ ​incorporate​ ​information​ ​about​ ​the​ ​relative​ ​distance​ ​of​ ​objects.​ ​A​ ​monocular 
observer​ ​moving​ ​in​ ​different​ ​directions​ ​causes​ ​objects​ ​to​ ​move​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​one​ ​another​ ​in​ ​the​ ​image 
(motion​ ​parallax).​ ​While​ ​this​ ​can,​ ​in​ ​theory,​ ​be​ ​used​ ​to​ ​calculate​ ​the​ ​3D​ ​layout​ ​of​ ​objects​ ​in​ ​the 
scene,​ ​an​ ​alternative​ ​is​ ​that​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​stores​ ​a​ ​graph​ ​of​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​states,​ ​connected​ ​by 
actions,​ ​just​ ​as​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​3D​ ​shape​ ​described​ ​above.​ ​In​ ​this​ ​case,​ ​the​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​the​ ​images​ ​that 
are​ ​important​ ​are​ ​the​ ​angular​ ​separations​ ​of​ ​objects​ ​and​ ​how​ ​these​ ​change​ ​as​ ​the​ ​observer​ ​moves 
their​ ​head.​ ​Very​ ​distant​ ​points​ ​like​ ​the​ ​stars​ ​do​ ​not​ ​change​ ​in​ ​the​ ​representation​ ​as​ ​the​ ​observer 
moves.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​if​ ​the​ ​current​ ​context​ ​is​ ​that​ ​the​ ​observer​ ​is​ ​looking​ ​at​ ​the​ ​pole​ ​star​ ​and​ ​they 
want​ ​to​ ​look​ ​at​ ​Ursa​ ​Major​ ​then​ ​Cassiopeia​ ​and​ ​then​ ​back​ ​to​ ​the​ ​pole​ ​star,​ ​the​ ​magnitude​ ​and 
direction​ ​of​ ​those​ ​three​ ​saccades,​ ​hence​ ​those​ ​nodes​ ​in​ ​the​ ​stored​ ​graph,​ ​will​ ​be​ ​independent​ ​of​ ​the 
location​ ​of​ ​the​ ​observer​ ​in​ ​the​ ​northern​ ​hemisphere.​ ​Provide​ ​that​ ​the​ ​angles​ ​of​ ​these​ ​saccades​ ​are 
large​ ​then​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​the​ ​angles​ ​do​ ​not​ ​change​ ​with​ ​observer​ ​translation​ ​means​ ​that​ ​the​ ​objects 
must​ ​be​ ​distant.​ ​This​ ​type​ ​of​ ​information​ ​can​ ​be​ ​used​ ​to​ ​identify​ ​near​ ​and​ ​far​ ​objects​ ​in​ ​a​ ​vista 
space​ ​(Glennerster,​ ​Hansard​ ​and​ ​Fitzgibbon​ ​2001;​ ​Glennerster​ ​2016).​ ​It​ ​also​ ​means​ ​that​ ​distant 
objects​ ​‘anchor’​ ​the​ ​representation​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​the​ ​world. 
 
4.4 Neither​ ​egocentric​ ​nor​ ​allocentric 
There​ ​are​ ​many​ ​tasks​ ​that​ ​only​ ​make​ ​sense​ ​with​ ​respect​ ​to​ ​certain​ ​coordinate​ ​frames​ ​(‘point​ ​to 
your​ ​left’,​ ​‘look​ ​behind​ ​the​ ​cupboard’,​ ​etc).​ ​The​ ​representation​ ​we​ ​have​ ​described​ ​here​ ​is 
capable​ ​of​ ​supporting​ ​actions​ ​defined​ ​by​ ​these​ ​relationships​ ​without​ ​having​ ​at​ ​any​ ​stage​ ​a​ ​3D 
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coordinate​ ​frame​ ​that​ ​describes​ ​the​ ​location​ ​of​ ​all​ ​points​ ​in​ ​the​ ​scene​ ​in​ ​an​ ​ego-,​ ​object-​ ​or 
world-centred​ ​frame.​ ​The​ ​representation​ ​is​ ​a​ ​graph​ ​of​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​states​ ​that​ ​carries 
information​ ​about​ ​the​ ​consequences​ ​of​ ​orienting​ ​movements​ ​(e.g.​ ​saccades)​ ​required​ ​to​ ​fixate 
different​ ​objects​ ​in​ ​the​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​and​ ​the​ ​translations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​head​ ​that​ ​would​ ​result​ ​in​ ​different 
views​ ​of​ ​a​ ​surface,​ ​where​ ​each​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​state​ ​is​ ​a​ ​node​ ​in​ ​the​ ​graph​ ​and​ ​the 
movements​ ​that​ ​would​ ​take​ ​the​ ​system​ ​from​ ​one​ ​state​ ​to​ ​another​ ​are​ ​the​ ​edges.​ ​Nevertheless,​ ​it 
is​ ​worth​ ​enunciating​ ​the​ ​links​ ​between​ ​this​ ​type​ ​of​ ​representation​ ​and​ ​one​ ​using​ ​an​ ​ego-​ ​or 
allocentric​ ​frame.​ ​If​ ​the​ ​observer​ ​is​ ​only​ ​making​ ​saccades​ ​(pure​ ​rotations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​eye),​ ​then​ ​the 
images​ ​and​ ​actions​ ​depicted​ ​by​ ​the​ ​nodes​ ​and​ ​edges​ ​in​ ​Fig​ ​2c​ ​can​ ​be​ ​mapped​ ​onto​ ​the​ ​sphere 
shown​ ​on​ ​the​ ​right​ ​in​ ​Fig​ ​2b.​ ​The​ ​eye​ ​is​ ​at​ ​the​ ​centre​ ​of​ ​this​ ​sphere​ ​and,​ ​in​ ​this​ ​sense,​ ​the 
representation​ ​for​ ​saccades​ ​is​ ​egocentric.​ ​But​ ​when​ ​we​ ​consider​ ​how​ ​distant​ ​points​ ​are 
represented,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​sense​ ​in​ ​which​ ​the​ ​representation​ ​is​ ​also​ ​world-based,​ ​as​ ​discussed​ ​above 
for​ ​the​ ​example​ ​of​ ​looking​ ​between​ ​stars.​ ​All​ ​static​ ​points​ ​in​ ​an​ ​allocentric​ ​representation 
maintain​ ​their​ ​coordinates​ ​when​ ​the​ ​observer​ ​moves.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​representation​ ​we​ ​propose,​ ​the 
relationship​ ​between​ ​stars​ ​remains​ ​constant​ ​when​ ​the​ ​observer​ ​moves​ ​(either​ ​rotates​ ​or 
translates)​ ​and​ ​in​ ​this​ ​sense​ ​distant​ ​points​ ​provide​ ​an​ ​allocentric​ ​foundation​ ​for​ ​the 
representation.​ ​Similar​ ​representations​ ​based​ ​on​ ​points​ ​at​ ​infinity​ ​have​ ​been​ ​described​ ​in 
computer​ ​vision​ ​(Kumar​ ​​et​ ​al​,​ ​1995).​ ​It​ ​may​ ​sound​ ​contradictory​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that​ ​a​ ​graph​ ​of​ ​sensory 
states​ ​has​ ​similarities​ ​with​ ​both​ ​ego-​ ​and​ ​allocentric​ ​representations​ ​at​ ​the​ ​same​ ​time​ ​but,​ ​since 
the​ ​representation​ ​has​ ​no​ ​3D​ ​origin​ ​or​ ​coordinate​ ​frame,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not​ ​identical​ ​to​ ​either​ ​of​ ​these 
types​ ​of​ ​3D​ ​frame​ ​(Glennerster​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​2001,​ ​2009;​ ​Glennerster,​ ​2013;​ ​Glennerster​ ​2016). 
5. Falsifiable​ ​predictions 
It​ ​is​ ​always​ ​helpful​ ​to​ ​make​ ​clear​ ​what​ ​experimental​ ​results​ ​would​ ​falsify​ ​a​ ​theory.​ ​The​ ​focus​ ​in 
this​ ​paper​ ​is​ ​on​ ​putative​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​transformations​ ​that​ ​transform​ ​information​ ​from​ ​a​ ​visual 
reference​ ​frame​ ​into​ ​egocentric​ ​or​ ​allocentric​ ​frames.​ ​Convincing​ ​evidence​ ​that​ ​this​ ​chain​ ​of 
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events​ ​occurs​ ​in​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​would​ ​make​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​untenable.​ ​Here,​ ​we​ ​outline​ ​examples​ ​of 
neurophysiological​ ​and​ ​psychophysical​ ​results​ ​that​ ​would​ ​be​ ​highly​ ​problematic​ ​for​ ​our​ ​proposal 
(for​ ​more​ ​detail,​ ​see​ ​Glennerster,​ ​2016).​ ​We​ ​also​ ​discuss​ ​task-dependent​ ​performance​ ​since,​ ​in​ ​the 
past,​ ​a​ ​finding​ ​of​ ​performance​ ​across​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of​ ​tasks​ ​that​ ​was​ ​consistent​ ​with​ ​a​ ​single 
(distorted)​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​space​ ​has​ ​been​ ​used​ ​to​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​forms​ ​a​ ​multi-purpose​ ​3D 
reconstruction​ ​of​ ​the​ ​scene.​ ​We​ ​question​ ​this​ ​conclusion​ ​in​ ​the​ ​light​ ​of​ ​more​ ​recent​ ​data. 
 
An​ ​example​ ​of​ ​a​ ​psychophysical​ ​experiment​ ​that​ ​would​ ​challenge​ ​our​ ​hypothesis​ ​would​ ​be​ ​one 
showing​ ​evidence​ ​of​ ​a​ ​head-centred​ ​representation​ ​in​ ​situations​ ​where​ ​the​ ​task​ ​had​ ​nothing​ ​to​ ​do 
with​ ​head​ ​orientation.​ ​According​ ​to​ ​the​ ​reconstruction​ ​hypothesis,​ ​egocentric​ ​representations​ ​such 
as​ ​head-​ ​and​ ​body-centred​ ​representations​ ​are​ ​generated​ ​as​ ​an​ ​intermediate​ ​step​ ​to​ ​(or,​ ​at​ ​the​ ​very 
least,​ ​in​ ​addition​ ​to)​ ​building​ ​world-centred​ ​representations​ ​(Burgess​ ​and​ ​O'Keefe​ ​1996;​ ​Burgess, 
2008;​ ​Whitlock,​ ​Sutherland,​ ​Witter,​ ​Moser​ ​and​ ​Moser​ ​2008).​ ​By​ ​contrast,​ ​if​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​simply​ ​uses 
the​ ​relevant​ ​sensory​ ​data​ ​for​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​task​ ​then​ ​there​ ​should​ ​be​ ​no​ ​psychophysical​ ​evidence​ ​of 
representation​ ​in​ ​an​ ​irrelevant​ ​coordinate​ ​frame.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​if​ ​an​ ​observer​ ​fixates​ ​a​ ​point​ ​and 
there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​moving​ ​stimulus​ ​on​ ​peripheral​ ​retina​ ​then,​ ​after​ ​a​ ​while,​ ​there​ ​will​ ​be​ ​adaptation​ ​to​ ​the 
moving​ ​stimulus​ ​at​ ​that​ ​retinal​ ​location.​ ​Suppose​ ​the​ ​observer​ ​now​ ​rotates​ ​their​ ​head​ ​while 
maintaining​ ​fixation​ ​so​ ​that​ ​the​ ​moving​ ​stimulus​ ​now​ ​falls​ ​at​ ​a​ ​different​ ​head-centric​ ​location. 
Note​ ​that​ ​everything​ ​in​ ​retinal​ ​coordinates​ ​remains​ ​the​ ​same​ ​in​ ​this​ ​situation​ ​and​ ​also​ ​in 
spatiotopic​ ​(world-based)​ ​coordinates​ ​(Melcher,​ ​2005;​ ​Knapen,​ ​Rolfs​ ​and​ ​Cavanagh​ ​2009; 
Zimmerman​ ​et​ ​al​ ​2011;​ ​Turi​ ​and​ ​Burr​ ​2012)​ ​because​ ​the​ ​position​ ​of​ ​the​ ​eye​ ​in​ ​relation​ ​to​ ​the​ ​scene 
is​ ​unchanged.​ ​If​ ​we​ ​arrange​ ​it​ ​so​ ​that​ ​the​ ​adapting​ ​phase​ ​is​ ​before​ ​and​ ​the​ ​test​ ​is​ ​after​ ​the​ ​head 
rotation,​ ​then​ ​we​ ​can​ ​look​ ​for​ ​any​ ​trace​ ​of​ ​adaptation​ ​that​ ​applies​ ​in​ ​a​ ​head-centred​ ​frame.​ ​A 
hypothesis​ ​that​ ​suggested​ ​allocentric​ ​coordinates​ ​are​ ​inherited​ ​from​ ​head-centred​ ​coordinates​ ​(e.g. 
Snyder​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​1998;​ ​Melcher,​ ​2005)​ ​would​ ​predict​ ​adaptation​ ​in​ ​head-centred​ ​coordinates.​ ​By 
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contrast,​ ​evidence​ ​of​ ​head-centred​ ​adaptation​ ​in​ ​this​ ​task​ ​would​ ​present​ ​severe​ ​difficulties​ ​for​ ​our 
hypothesis. 
 
Mechanisms​ ​that​ ​have​ ​been​ ​proposed​ ​for​ ​implementing​ ​coordinate​ ​transformations​ ​in​ ​the​ ​brain 
depend​ ​on​ ​anatomical​ ​relationships​ ​such​ ​that​ ​neighbouring​ ​neurons​ ​in​ ​one​ ​area​ ​map​ ​to 
neighbouring​ ​neurons​ ​in​ ​the​ ​next.​ ​As​ ​a​ ​consequence,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​consistent​ ​​format​​ ​to​ ​the​ ​new 
representation​ ​(e.g.​ ​Pouget​ ​et​ ​al​ ​2002).​ ​Neurophysiological​ ​evidence​ ​of​ ​representations​ ​in 
particular​ ​formats​ ​could​ ​also​ ​present​ ​difficulties​ ​for​ ​our​ ​proposal.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​it​ ​has​ ​been​ ​pointed 
out​ ​that​ ​if​ ​one​ ​signal,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​a​ ​head​ ​direction​ ​signal,​ ​is​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​the​ ​output​ ​of​ ​a​ ​transformation 
(e.g.​ ​transforming​ ​an​ ​egocentric​ ​representation​ ​into​ ​a​ ​world-centred​ ​one)​ ​then​ ​this​ ​could​ ​be​ ​done 
by​ ​generating​ ​multiple​ ​copies​ ​of​ ​the​ ​egocentric​ ​representation​ ​and​ ​using​ ​the​ ​head-direction 
information​ ​as​ ​a​ ​gating​ ​signal​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​which​ ​egocentric​ ​map​ ​passed​ ​on​ ​information​ ​to​ ​the 
world-centred​ ​map​ ​(Byrne​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​2007).​ ​Although​ ​one​ ​can​ ​see​ ​how​ ​this​ ​might​ ​work​ ​for​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of 
rotation,​ ​it​ ​would​ ​be​ ​much​ ​harder​ ​to​ ​do​ ​the​ ​same​ ​thing​ ​for​ ​translation​ ​where​ ​there​ ​are​ ​many​ ​more 
potential​ ​input-output​ ​relationships.​ ​In​ ​any​ ​case,​ ​discovery​ ​of​ ​an​ ​anatomical​ ​mechanism​ ​of​ ​this 
sort​ ​for​ ​carrying​ ​out​ ​transformations,​ ​including​ ​duplication​ ​of​ ​input​ ​representations,​ ​would​ ​falsify 
our​ ​proposal​ ​since​ ​it​ ​is​ ​based​ ​on​ ​quite​ ​different​ ​principles.​ ​In​ ​Section​ ​6.3,​ ​we​ ​discuss​ ​strong​ ​and 
weaker​ ​interpretations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​idea​ ​of​ ​an​ ​egocentric​ ​reference​ ​frame.​ ​An​ ​advantage​ ​of​ ​our​ ​proposal 
is​ ​that,​ ​at​ ​the​ ​level​ ​of​ ​neural​ ​mechanisms,​ ​we​ ​are​ ​not​ ​proposing​ ​any​ ​novel​ ​or​ ​complicated 
mechanism​ ​of​ ​the​ ​type​ ​put​ ​forward​ ​by​ ​Byrne​ ​et​ ​al​ ​(2007).​ ​The​ ​only​ ​neural​ ​operation​ ​we​ ​mention 
explicitly​ ​in​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​a​ ​fundamental​ ​and​ ​widely​ ​accepted​ ​one​ ​in​ ​neuroscience,​ ​namely​ ​the 
process​ ​of​ ​comparing​ ​a​ ​long​ ​vector​ ​of​ ​firing​ ​rates​ ​with​ ​a​ ​large​ ​number​ ​of​ ​similar​ ​length​ ​vectors 
stored​ ​as​ ​synaptic​ ​weights​ ​(Section​ ​3). 
 
Task-dependent​ ​performance​ ​is​ ​a​ ​crucial​ ​component​ ​of​ ​the​ ​argument​ ​about​ ​3D​ ​reconstruction 
versus​ ​a​ ​graph​ ​of​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​states.​ ​Indeed,​ ​Gogel​ ​(1993)​ ​argued​ ​the​ ​opposite​ ​case​ ​to 
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the​ ​one​ ​we​ ​are​ ​putting​ ​forward,​ ​pointing​ ​to​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​performance​ ​in​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of​ ​different​ ​tasks 
could​ ​be​ ​explained​ ​by​ ​assuming​ ​by​ ​a​ ​similar​ ​distortion​ ​of​ ​visual​ ​space​ ​and​ ​using​ ​this​ ​‘explanatory 
parsimony’​ ​as​ ​evidence​ ​that​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​builds​ ​a​ ​single,​ ​multi-purpose​ ​internal​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​the 
scene.​ ​However,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​now​ ​considerable​ ​evidence​ ​that​ ​the​ ​internal​ ​representation​ ​used​ ​by​ ​the 
visual​ ​system​ ​is​ ​something​ ​much​ ​looser​ ​than​ ​this,​ ​with​ ​no​ ​single​ ​representation​ ​being​ ​capable​ ​of 
explaining​ ​performance.​ ​Instead,​ ​different​ ​tasks​ ​lead​ ​to​ ​the​ ​adoption​ ​of​ ​strategies​ ​or​ ​heuristics​ ​by 
the​ ​visual​ ​system​ ​(Koenderink​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​2002;​ ​Smeets,​ ​Sousa​ ​and​ ​Brenner,​ ​2009;​ ​Svarverud,​ ​Gilson 
and​ ​Glennerster​ ​2012;​ ​Glennerster​ ​et​ ​al​ ​1996;​ ​Knill,​ ​Bondada​ ​and​ ​Chhabra,​ ​2011).​ ​Task 
dependency​ ​fits​ ​with​ ​the​ ​idea​ ​of​ ​recognising​ ​a​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​context:​ ​the​ ​task​ ​forms​ ​part​ ​of 
the​ ​motivational​ ​context​ ​and​ ​this​ ​dictates​ ​which​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​the​ ​available​ ​sensory​ ​information​ ​are 
relevant.​ ​Together,​ ​these​ ​determine​ ​what​ ​the​ ​output​ ​should​ ​be.​ ​Although​ ​we​ ​are​ ​discussing 
task-dependency​ ​in​ ​a​ ​section​ ​on​ ​‘falsifiable​ ​predictions’,​ ​we​ ​believe​ ​that​ ​this​ ​has​ ​already​ ​been 
tested​ ​and​ ​that,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​years​ ​since​ ​Gogel​ ​made​ ​his​ ​claim,​ ​a​ ​large​ ​body​ ​of​ ​evidence​ ​has​ ​built​ ​up 
against​ ​the​ ​idea​ ​of​ ​a​ ​single,​ ​multi-purpose​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​space. 
6. Challenges  
Next​ ​we​ ​consider​ ​some​ ​challenges​ ​to​ ​our​ ​proposal,​ ​starting​ ​with​ ​challenges​ ​arising​ ​from​ ​the 
philosophical​ ​literature. 
6.1 Representation​ ​and​ ​action-based​ ​theories 
Some​ ​philosophical​ ​work​ ​proposes​ ​alternatives​ ​to​ ​representation​ ​in​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frames​ ​by 
emphasizing,​ ​as​ ​we​ ​do,​ ​the​ ​connection​ ​between​ ​spatial​ ​perception​ ​and​ ​action​ ​(O’Regan​ ​and​ ​Noë, 
2001;​ ​Noë,​ ​2004).​ ​We​ ​begin​ ​by​ ​distinguishing​ ​between​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​and​ ​these​ ​related​ ​ideas,​ ​and 
explaining​ ​why​ ​a​ ​key​ ​challenge​ ​to​ ​those​ ​ideas​ ​does​ ​not​ ​apply​ ​to​ ​our​ ​proposal.  
 
O’Regan​ ​and​ ​Noë​ ​introduce​ ​their​ ​theory​ ​as​ ​follows: 
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 We​ ​propose​ ​that​ ​seeing​ ​is​ ​a​ ​way​ ​of​ ​acting.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​way​ ​of​ ​exploring​ ​the 
environment.​ ​Activity​ ​in​ ​internal​ ​representations​ ​does​ ​not​ ​generate​ ​the​ ​experience​ ​of 
seeing.​ ​The​ ​outside​ ​world​ ​serves​ ​as​ ​its​ ​own,​ ​external,​ ​representation.​ ​The​ ​experience​ ​of 
seeing​ ​occurs​ ​when​ ​the​ ​organism​ ​masters​ ​what​ ​we​ ​call​ ​the​ ​governing​ ​laws​ ​of​ ​sensorimotor 
contingency. 
O’Regan​ ​and​ ​Noë,​ ​2001:​ ​939 
 
O’Regan​ ​and​ ​Noë​ ​propose​ ​that​ ​visual​ ​experience​ ​consists​ ​in​ ​a​ ​way​ ​of​ ​acting​ ​which​ ​involves​ ​the 
exercise​ ​of​ ​sensorimotor​ ​knowledge—knowledge​ ​of​ ​how​ ​sensory​ ​experience​ ​will​ ​change​ ​given 
certain​ ​movements—rather​ ​than​ ​in​ ​the​ ​reconstruction​ ​of​ ​a​ ​detailed​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​visible 
scene.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​visual​ ​experience​ ​of​ ​the​ ​shape​ ​of​ ​a​ ​cube​ ​consists​ ​in​ ​an​ ​active​ ​movement 
which​ ​exercises​ ​knowledge​ ​of​ ​the​ ​sensory​ ​consequences​ ​of​ ​this​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​movement​ ​around​ ​a​ ​cube. 
Similarly,​ ​according​ ​to​ ​our​ ​proposal,​ ​visual​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​the​ ​shape​ ​of​ ​a​ ​cube​ ​consists​ ​in 
movement​ ​and​ ​a​ ​matching​ ​of​ ​current​ ​and​ ​stored​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​contexts​ ​which​ ​registers​ ​the 
sensory​ ​consequences​ ​of​ ​this​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​movement​ ​around​ ​a​ ​cube.​ ​In​ ​both​ ​theories,​ ​action​ ​across​ ​a 
space​ ​replaces​ ​the​ ​need​ ​for​ ​an​ ​internal​ ​3D​ ​model​ ​of​ ​that​ ​space. 
 
However,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​at​ ​least​ ​one​ ​important​ ​respect​ ​in​ ​which​ ​O’Regan​ ​and​ ​Noë’s​ ​theory​ ​goes​ ​further 
than​ ​what​ ​we​ ​propose​ ​here:​ ​they​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​the​ ​process​ ​of​ ​vision​ ​consists​ ​in​ ​a​ ​way​ ​of​ ​acting,​ ​rather 
than​ ​a​ ​process​ ​involving​ ​internal​ ​visual​ ​representations.​ ​By​ ​contrast,​ ​though​ ​we​ ​deny​ ​that​ ​the 
process​ ​of​ ​vision​ ​consists​ ​in​ ​transformations​ ​between​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​representations,​ ​we 
propose​ ​a​ ​process​ ​that​ ​fundamentally​ ​involves​ ​internal​ ​visual​ ​representations​ ​of​ ​a​ ​different​ ​kind. 
More​ ​specifically,​ ​we​ ​propose​ ​that​ ​a​ ​large​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​information​ ​is​ ​stored​ ​and​ ​that​ ​this​ ​store​ ​of 
information​ ​is​ ​exploited​ ​in​ ​a​ ​process​ ​of​ ​comparing​ ​current​ ​and​ ​stored​ ​sensory+motivational 
contexts.​ ​This​ ​store​ ​of​ ​information​ ​is​​ ​W​​ ​in​ ​the​ ​formalism​ ​above.​ ​Not​ ​every​ ​brain​ ​state​ ​which 
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carries​ ​information​ ​is​ ​a​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​that​ ​information:​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​good​ ​sense​ ​in​ ​which​ ​any 
effect​ ​carries​ ​information​ ​about​ ​its​ ​causes,​ ​and​ ​it​ ​is​ ​notoriously​ ​difficult​ ​to​ ​say​ ​exactly​ ​what​ ​it 
takes​ ​for​ ​an​ ​information-carrying​ ​state​ ​to​ ​count​ ​as​ ​a​ ​representation.​ ​But​ ​by​ ​most​ ​criteria​ ​​W​​ ​is​ ​a 
very​ ​plausible​ ​candidate​ ​for​ ​representation,​ ​because​ ​of​ ​the​ ​simple​ ​computational​ ​role​ ​it​ ​plays​ ​in 
perception​ ​and​ ​action. 
 
For​ ​example,​ ​one​ ​common​ ​criterion​ ​for​ ​a​ ​brain​ ​state’s​ ​representing,​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​merely​ ​carrying, 
information​ ​is​ ​that​ ​carrying​ ​this​ ​information​ ​is​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​state’s​ ​​function​.​ ​That​ ​is,​ ​roughly,​ ​either 
the​ ​ontogenetic​ ​(Dretske,​ ​1981)​ ​or​ ​the​ ​phylogenetic​ ​(Millikan,​ ​1984)​ ​explanation​ ​of​ ​why​ ​the​ ​brain 
state​ ​occurs​ ​in​ ​the​ ​organism​ ​lies​ ​in​ ​a​ ​functional​ ​role​ ​which​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​state​ ​plays​ ​in​ ​virtue​ ​of 
carrying​ ​the​ ​information​ ​in​ ​question.​ ​The​ ​brain​ ​state​ ​corresponding​ ​to​ ​​W​​ ​carries​ ​information​ ​about 
various​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​contexts​ ​which​ ​might​ ​obtain,​ ​and​ ​in​ ​virtue​ ​of​ ​carrying​ ​this 
information,​ ​this​ ​brain​ ​state​ ​plays​ ​a​ ​distinctive​ ​computational​ ​role:​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​​W​​ ​are​ ​matched​ ​to 
the​ ​actual​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​contexts​ ​marking​ ​any​ ​given​ ​episode​ ​of​ ​perception.​ ​Our​ ​hypothesis 
is​ ​that​ ​this​ ​computational​ ​role​ ​is​ ​integral​ ​to​ ​successful​ ​perception​ ​and​ ​action.​ ​Successful​ ​perception 
and​ ​action​ ​are,​ ​in​ ​turn,​ ​integral​ ​to​ ​the​ ​organism’s​ ​development​ ​and​ ​survival.​ ​So​ ​it​ ​is​ ​very​ ​plausible 
that​ ​​W​’s​ ​functional​ ​role​ ​as​ ​a​ ​store​ ​of​ ​information​ ​about​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​contexts​ ​explains 
why​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​state​ ​corresponding​ ​to​ ​​W​​ ​occurs​ ​in​ ​the​ ​organism.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​very​ ​plausible​ ​that​ ​by​ ​this 
common​ ​criterion​ ​for​ ​representation,​ ​​W​ ​​is​ ​a​ ​representation.​ ​(In​ ​the​ ​next​ ​section,​ ​we​ ​assess​ ​in​ ​more 
detail​ ​what​ ​both​ ​ ​ ​and​ ​​W​ ​​represent.)r→   
 
Because​ ​​W​​ ​is​ ​a​ ​very​ ​plausible​ ​candidate​ ​for​ ​representation,​ ​one​ ​influential​ ​criticism​ ​of​ ​O’Regan 
and​ ​Noë’s​ ​theory​ ​does​ ​not​ ​apply​ ​to​ ​our​ ​proposal.​ ​A​ ​theory​ ​is​ ​behaviorist--in​ ​the​ ​standard 
philosophical​ ​terminology--if​ ​it​ ​​reduces​ ​cognition​ ​to​ ​behavior,​ ​or​ ​if​ ​the​ ​fully​ ​articulated​ ​theory 
eliminates​ ​references​ ​to​ ​cognition,​ ​replacing​ ​them​ ​with​ ​references​ ​to​ ​action​ ​or​ ​behavior. 
Behaviorism​ ​is​ ​notoriously​ ​problematic,​ ​in​ ​part​ ​because​ ​it​ ​is​ ​too​ ​liberal​ ​in​ ​counting​ ​as​ ​genuinely 
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cognitive​ ​any​ ​system​ ​which​ ​exhibits​ ​the​ ​relevant​ ​behavior​ ​in​ ​the​ ​relevant​ ​circumstances.​​ ​Ned 
Block​ ​(2001)​ ​criticizes​ ​O’Regan​ ​and​ ​Noë’s​ ​sensorimotor​ ​theory​ ​on​ ​the​ ​grounds​ ​that​ ​it​ ​commits​ ​to 
this​ ​problematic​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​behaviorism:​ ​it​ ​counts​ ​as​ ​having​ ​visual​ ​perception​ ​any​ ​system​ ​which 
acts​ ​in​ ​the​ ​right​ ​way​ ​in​ ​the​ ​right​ ​circumstances,​ ​whatever​ ​(if​ ​anything)​ ​in​ ​the​ ​system​ ​mediates 
between​ ​circumstances​ ​and​ ​action.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​a​ ​delicate​ ​issue​ ​whether​ ​O’Regan​ ​and​ ​Noë’s​ ​sensorimotor 
theory​ ​is​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​behaviorist​ ​in​ ​this​ ​way.​ ​But​ ​we​ ​need​ ​not​ ​resolve​ ​that​ ​issue​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​see​ ​that​ ​our 
proposal​ ​is​ ​not​ ​behaviorist​ ​and​ ​does​ ​not​ ​fall​ ​foul​ ​of​ ​Block’s​ ​criticism:​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​treats​ ​visual 
perception​ ​as​ ​fundamentally​ ​based​ ​on​ ​certain​ ​stored​ ​representations,​ ​and​ ​so​ ​does​ ​not​ ​claim​ ​that 
any​ ​form​ ​of​ ​behavior​ ​is​ ​by​ ​itself​ ​sufficient​ ​for​ ​visual​ ​perception. 
 
Our​ ​proposal​ ​does​ ​deny​ ​that​ ​the​ ​process​ ​of​ ​vision​ ​consists​ ​in​ ​computation​ ​over​ ​representations​ ​​of​ ​a 
certain​ ​kind​:​ ​spatial​ ​representations​ ​specified​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frames.​ ​So​ ​challenges​ ​to 
our​ ​proposal​ ​lie​ ​not​ ​in​ ​the​ ​idea​ ​that​ ​internal​ ​representations​ ​are​ ​required​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​perception,​ ​but 
in​ ​the​ ​more​ ​specific​ ​idea​ ​that​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​representation,​ ​or​ ​at​ ​least​ ​some​ ​form​ ​of 
representation​ ​inconsistent​ ​with​ ​our​ ​positive​ ​proposal,​ ​is​ ​required​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​perception.​ ​We​ ​turn​ ​to 
this​ ​next. 
 
6.2  Perceptual​ ​systems​ ​vs​ ​mere​ ​sensorimotor​ ​systems 
The​ ​challenges​ ​we​ ​assess​ ​in​ ​this​ ​section​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​ill-placed​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​genuine 
perception​ ​of​ ​the​ ​environment.​ ​We​ ​have​ ​described​ ​a​ ​system​ ​through​ ​which​ ​the​ ​environment’s 
sensory​ ​effects​ ​generate​ ​motor​ ​responses,​ ​but​ ​the​ ​challenges​ ​we​ ​assess​ ​here​ ​maintain​ ​that​ ​we​ ​have 
not​ ​thereby​ ​explained​ ​genuine​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​the​ ​environment.​ ​There​ ​are​ ​difficult​ ​philosophical 
questions​ ​about​ ​what,​ ​in​ ​principle,​ ​constitutes​ ​genuine​ ​perception,​ ​and​ ​of​ ​course​ ​difficult​ ​empirical 
questions​ ​about​ ​how​ ​genuine​ ​perception​ ​is​ ​achieved​ ​by​ ​the​ ​human​ ​brain.​ ​We​ ​do​ ​not​ ​pretend​ ​to 
offer​ ​a​ ​full​ ​explanation.​ ​Instead​ ​we​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​as​ ​well-placed​ ​in​ ​this​ ​respect​ ​as​ ​a​ ​3D 
coordinate​ ​frame​ ​theory. 
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 Start​ ​with​ ​the​ ​idea​ ​that​ ​perceptual​ ​representation​ ​is​ ​distinct​ ​from​ ​mere​ ​sensation,​ ​in​ ​that​ ​perceptual 
representation​ ​is​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​a​ ​distal​ ​environment​ ​(Burge,​ ​2010).​ ​One​ ​possible​ ​challenge​ ​to 
our​ ​proposal​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​it​ ​cannot​ ​do​ ​justice​ ​to​ ​this​ ​distinction.  
 
The​ ​sensory​ ​component​ ​of​ ​a​ ​current​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​context​ ​is​ ​often​ ​identified​ ​above​ ​as​ ​an 
‘image’.​ ​It​ ​may​ ​be​ ​tempting​ ​to​ ​read​ ​this​ ​as​ ​if​ ​it​ ​were​ ​an​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​sensory​ ​impressions​ ​or​ ​sense 
data,​ ​construed​ ​as​ ​proximal​ ​objects​ ​of​ ​conscious​ ​experience​ ​(Russell​ ​1912;​ ​Price​ ​1950;​ ​Moore 
1953).​ ​If​ ​this​ ​is​ ​combined​ ​with​ ​a​ ​similar​ ​reading​ ​of​ ​the​ ​motivational​ ​component​ ​of​ ​a 
sensory+motivational​ ​context,​ ​as​ ​a​ ​felt​ ​urge​ ​or​ ​motivating​ ​sensation,​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​may​ ​seem​ ​to 
commit​ ​to​ ​a​ ​​phenomenalist​​ ​scheme​ ​of​ ​representation--a​ ​scheme​ ​such​ ​that​ ​the​ ​world​ ​represented​ ​by 
visual​ ​processes​ ​consists​ ​in​ ​nothing​ ​more​ ​than​ ​a​ ​series​ ​of​ ​experienced​ ​sensations​ ​connected​ ​by 
transitions​ ​which​ ​those​ ​sensations​ ​motivate.​ ​Our​ ​proposal​ ​should​ ​not​ ​be​ ​read​ ​in​ ​that​ ​way.​ ​The 
sensory​ ​component​ ​of​ ​a​ ​current​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​context​ ​includes​ ​images​ ​only​ ​in​ ​the​ ​sense 
that​ ​the​ ​set​ ​of​ ​neural​ ​firings​ ​ ​ ​may​ ​include​ ​neural​ ​firings​ ​corresponding​ ​to​ ​the​ ​retinotopic​ ​signalsr→  
that​ ​we​ ​know​ ​about​ ​in​ ​visual​ ​areas​ ​V1,​ ​V2,​ ​V4,​ ​V5,​ ​MST,​ ​IT​ ​etc.​ ​These​ ​signals​ ​form​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the 
input​ ​to​ ​a​ ​process​ ​that​ ​is​ ​responsible​ ​for​ ​3D​ ​perception,​ ​just​ ​as​ ​in​ ​a​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​theory, 
retinotopic​ ​signals​ ​form​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​input​ ​to​ ​the​ ​computations​ ​required​ ​to​ ​construct​ ​3D​ ​coordinate 
frames.​ ​In​ ​our​ ​proposal,​ ​just​ ​as​ ​in​ ​a​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​theory,​ ​retinotopic​ ​signals​ ​need​ ​not​ ​be 
construed​ ​as​ ​objects​ ​of​ ​conscious​ ​experience.​ ​Our​ ​proposal​ ​does​ ​not​ ​entail​ ​a​ ​phenomenalist 
scheme​ ​of​ ​representation. 
 
In​ ​fact​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​as​ ​well-placed​ ​as​ ​a​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​theory​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​distal 
vista​ ​space.​ ​Take​ ​a​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​theory​ ​in​ ​which​ ​the​ ​format​ ​of​ ​representations​ ​in​ ​the​ ​visual 
cortex​ ​resembles​ ​the​ ​spatial​ ​layout​ ​of​ ​distal​ ​vista​ ​space:​ ​spatial​ ​relations​ ​among​ ​units​ ​of 
representation​ ​in​ ​the​ ​cortex​ ​correspond​ ​to​ ​spatial​ ​relations​ ​among​ ​the​ ​objects​ ​represented​ ​(e.g. 
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Byrne​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2007).​ ​This​ ​resemblance​ ​does​ ​not​ ​explain​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​distal​ ​spatial​ ​layout. 
Unlike​ ​representation,​ ​resemblance​ ​is​ ​a​ ​symmetrical​ ​relation,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​environment​ ​does​ ​not 
represent​ ​the​ ​cortex.​ ​Moreover,​ ​many​ ​patterns​ ​which​ ​resemble​ ​the​ ​layout​ ​of​ ​an​ ​environment​ ​do​ ​not 
represent​ ​it.​ ​For​ ​example​ ​if​ ​the​ ​layout​ ​of​ ​objects​ ​on​ ​my​ ​desk​ ​happens​ ​to​ ​resemble​ ​the​ ​layout​ ​of 
objects​ ​in​ ​your​ ​vista​ ​space,​ ​neither​ ​represents​ ​the​ ​other,​ ​because​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​appropriate​ ​causal​ ​or 
explanatory​ ​connection​ ​between​ ​them​ ​(Putnam,​ ​1981).​ ​It​ ​is​ ​controversial​ ​what​ ​​does​​ ​suffice​ ​for​ ​a 
brain​ ​state​ ​to​ ​represent​ ​a​ ​feature​ ​of​ ​the​ ​environment​ ​(Stich​ ​and​ ​Warfield,​ ​1994)​ ​but​ ​on​ ​the​ ​face​ ​of 
it,​ ​any​ ​plausible​ ​explanation​ ​of​ ​this​ ​achievement​ ​will​ ​have​ ​to​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​causal​ ​or​ ​explanatory 
relations​ ​between​ ​features​ ​of​ ​the​ ​environment,​ ​brain​ ​states​ ​which​ ​carry​ ​information​ ​about​ ​those 
features,​ ​and/or​ ​brain​ ​states’​ ​functional​ ​contributions​ ​to​ ​action​ ​on​ ​those​ ​features. ​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​a 3
coordinate​ ​frame​ ​theory​ ​might​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​the​ ​spatial​ ​layout​ ​of​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​systematically​ ​explains 
the​ ​corresponding​ ​spatial​ ​arrangement​ ​of​ ​neuron-firing​ ​in​ ​the​ ​cortex,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​this​ ​relationship​ ​in 
turn​ ​systematically​ ​explains​ ​the​ ​observer’s​ ​capacity​ ​to​ ​act​ ​on​ ​vista​ ​space;​ ​that​ ​is​ ​why​ ​the​ ​relevant 
brain​ ​states​ ​constitute​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​your​ ​vista​ ​space,​ ​while​ ​the​ ​layout​ ​of​ ​objects​ ​on​ ​my​ ​desk 
does​ ​not.  
 
The​ ​same​ ​resources​ ​are​ ​available​ ​if​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​correct.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​first​ ​instance,​ ​the​ ​set​ ​of​ ​synaptic 
weights​ ​​W​ ​​carries​ ​information​ ​about​ ​sets​ ​of​ ​possible​ ​neural​ ​firings.​ ​But​ ​​W​ ​​and​ ​ ​ ​also​ ​carryr→  
information​ ​about​ ​distal​ ​features​ ​of​ ​the​ ​environment​ ​including​ ​its​ ​spatial​ ​layout,​ ​a​ ​layout​ ​which 
systematically​ ​explains​ ​the​ ​various​ ​values​ ​of​ ​ ​ ​as​ ​the​ ​observer​ ​moves​ ​their​ ​head​ ​or​ ​eyes,​ ​and​ ​sor→  
systematically​ ​explains​ ​why​ ​ ​ ​is​ ​matched​ ​with​ ​certain​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​​W​ ​​during​ ​that​ ​episode.​ ​In​ ​turn,r→  
these​ ​matches​ ​systematically​ ​explain​ ​the​ ​actions​ ​on​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​which​ ​are​ ​outputs​ ​of​ ​the​ ​process. 
For​ ​example,​ ​take​ ​a​ ​scene​ ​in​ ​which​ ​three​ ​objects​ ​are​ ​relatively​ ​close​ ​to​ ​the​ ​observer.​ ​The​ ​distance 
3 ​ ​Some​ ​but​ ​not​ ​all​ ​philosophical​ ​theories​ ​of​ ​what​ ​a​ ​brain​ ​state​ ​represents​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​state’s 
functional​ ​contributions​ ​to​ ​action.​ ​As​ ​discussed​ ​in​ ​Section​ ​6.1,​ ​some​ ​theories​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​the​ ​idea​ ​that​ ​a 
representation​ ​of​ ​​X​​ ​has​ ​the​ ​function​ ​of​ ​carrying​ ​information​ ​about​ ​​X​.​ ​The​ ​representation’s​ ​having​ ​this 
function​ ​will​ ​involve​ ​its​ ​functional​ ​contribution​ ​to​ ​adaptive​ ​actions​ ​involving​ ​​X​.​ ​By​ ​contrast,​ ​Fodor 
(1987)​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​what​ ​a​ ​brain​ ​state​ ​represents​ ​turn​ ​only​ ​on​ ​what​ ​causes​ ​or​ ​would​ ​have​ ​caused​ ​that​ ​brain 
state,​ ​not​ ​on​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​state’s​ ​functional​ ​contribution​ ​to​ ​action. 
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to​ ​these​ ​objects​ ​explains​ ​why,​ ​as​ ​the​ ​observer​ ​moves​ ​her​ ​head​ ​in​ ​different​ ​directions,​ ​the​ ​angular 
separation​ ​between​ ​the​ ​projection​ ​of​ ​the​ ​objects’​ ​on​ ​the​ ​retina​ ​changes​ ​(see​ ​​Object​ ​distance 
above).​ ​This​ ​contribution​ ​to​ ​ ,​ ​over​ ​the​ ​course​ ​of​ ​the​ ​visual​ ​episode,​ ​marks​ ​a​ ​distinctive​ ​series​ ​ofr→  
sensory+motivational​ ​contexts​ ​precisely​ ​in​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​a​ ​consequence​ ​of​ ​the​ ​objects’​ ​being​ ​relatively 
close​ ​(if​ ​all​ ​three​ ​points​ ​were​ ​distant​ ​there​ ​would​ ​be​ ​little​ ​change).​ ​So​ ​when​ ​ ​ ​is​ ​matched​ ​withr→  
elements​ ​of​ ​​W​,​ ​yielding​ ​further​ ​actions​ ​distinctive​ ​of​ ​the​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​contexts,​ ​those 
distinctive​ ​further​ ​actions​ ​occur​ ​​because​​ ​the​ ​objects​ ​are​ ​close--more​ ​specifically,​ ​they​ ​occur 
because​ ​ ​ ​and​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​​W​,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​process​ ​of​ ​matching​ ​them,​​ ​​carry​ ​information​ ​about​ ​ther→  
objects’​ ​being​ ​close. 
 
This​ ​and​ ​similar​ ​examples​ ​(Glennerster,​ ​Hansard​ ​and​ ​Fitzgibbon​ ​2001,​ ​2009;​ ​Glennerster​ ​2013) 
give​ ​us​ ​reason​ ​to​ ​think​ ​that​ ​the​ ​mechanism​ ​we​ ​have​ ​described​ ​represents​ ​the​ ​spatial​ ​layout​ ​of​ ​the 
observer’s​ ​distal​ ​environment.​ ​The​ ​reason​ ​we​ ​have​ ​given​ ​is​ ​in​ ​line​ ​with​ ​Tyler​ ​Burge’s​ ​(2010) 
criterion​ ​for​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​a​ ​distal​ ​environment.​ ​For​ ​Burge,​ ​perceptual​ ​constancy​ ​--​ ​i.e.​ ​the​ ​use​ ​of 
varying​ ​sensory​ ​consequences​ ​to​ ​generate​ ​information​ ​about​ ​constant​ ​features​ ​of​ ​the​ ​distal 
environment​ ​--​ ​is​ ​the​ ​key​ ​criterion​ ​for​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​a​ ​distal​ ​environment.​ ​We​ ​have​ ​explained​ ​how, 
on​ ​our​ ​proposal,​ ​information​ ​about​ ​distal​ ​layout​ ​is​ ​extracted​ ​from​ ​variations​ ​in​ ​ .r→  
 
We​ ​do​ ​not​ ​insist​ ​that​ ​Burge’s​ ​criterion​ ​is​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​sufficient​ ​for​ ​genuine​ ​perception.​ ​We​ ​simply​ ​note 
that​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​as​ ​well​ ​placed​ ​in​ ​this​ ​respect​ ​as​ ​a​ ​theory​ ​according​ ​to​ ​which​ ​constant​ ​features 
of​ ​the​ ​distal​ ​environment​ ​are​ ​represented​ ​in​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame.​ ​We​ ​also​ ​leave​ ​it​ ​open​ ​which 
specific​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​the​ ​mechanism​ ​we​ ​have​ ​proposed​ ​bear​ ​representational​ ​content​ ​about​ ​the 
distal​ ​layout​ ​of​ ​vista​ ​space.​ ​On​ ​an​ ​‘embodied’​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​our​ ​proposal,​ ​the​ ​content-bearing​ ​event 
is​ ​the​ ​entire​ ​loop,​ ​including​ ​the​ ​physical​ ​movements​ ​which​ ​take​ ​the​ ​observer​ ​between​ ​different 
values​ ​of​ ​ ​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​the​ ​internal​ ​process​ ​of​ ​matching​ ​ ​ ​with​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​​W​.​ ​Alternatively,​ ​on​ ​anr→ r→  
approach​ ​which​ ​treats​ ​only​ ​internal​ ​brain​ ​events​ ​and​ ​brain​ ​states​ ​as​ ​bearers​ ​of​ ​representational 
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content,​ ​the​ ​content-bearing​ ​event​ ​or​ ​state​ ​might​ ​be​ ​any​ ​or​ ​all​ ​of​ ​ ​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​​W​,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​internal,r→  
process​ ​of​ ​matching​ ​them;​ ​it​ ​might​ ​also​ ​include​ ​a​ ​‘motor​ ​error’​ ​signal​ ​indicating​ ​divergence 
between​ ​expected​ ​and​ ​actual​ ​values​ ​of​ ​ ​ ​(Section​ ​3;​ ​cf.​ ​Clark​ ​2013).r→  
 
Now​ ​consider​ ​a​ ​further​ ​challenge,​ ​which​ ​is​ ​posed​ ​by​ ​a​ ​more​ ​demanding​​ ​​characterization​ ​of 
perception.​ ​According​ ​to​ ​this​ ​more​ ​demanding​ ​characterization,​ ​the​ ​form​ ​of​ ​perception​ ​enjoyed​ ​by 
humans​ ​is​ ​​objective​​ ​in​ ​the​ ​following​ ​sense:​ ​we​ ​perceive​ ​features​ ​of​ ​the​ ​distal​ ​environment​ ​which 
are​ ​in​ ​principle​ ​independent​ ​of​ ​the​ ​observer’s​ ​actual​ ​and​ ​possible​ ​responses. ​ ​The​ ​challenge 4
maintains​ ​that​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​cannot​ ​explain​ ​how​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​such​ ​features​ ​occurs,​ ​and​ ​so​ ​cannot 
explain​ ​the​ ​form​ ​of​ ​perception​ ​enjoyed​ ​by​ ​humans.​ ​As​ ​before,​ ​our​ ​response​ ​is​ ​not​ ​to​ ​offer​ ​a​ ​full 
explanation​ ​of​ ​how​ ​this​ ​occurs,​ ​but​ ​to​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​as​ ​well-placed​ ​in​ ​this​ ​respect​ ​as​ ​a 
3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​theory. 
 
John​ ​Campbell​ ​illustrates​ ​this​ ​more​ ​demanding​ ​characterization​ ​of​ ​perception​ ​as​ ​follows: 
 
Gibson​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​have​ ​thought​ ​that​ ​the​ ​affordances​ ​provided​ ​by​ ​an​ ​object​ ​are​ ​all​ ​that​ ​we 
ever​ ​see.​ ​This​ ​view​ ​is​ ​hard​ ​to​ ​sustain.​ ​Once,​ ​when​ ​I​ ​visited​ ​Warwick​ ​University 
Psychology​ ​Department,​ ​someone​ ​told​ ​me​ ​the​ ​following​ ​story.​ ​One​ ​year,​ ​pigeons​ ​started 
nesting​ ​in​ ​the​ ​concrete​ ​interstices​ ​of​ ​the​ ​multi-storey​ ​car​ ​parks​ ​in​ ​the​ ​university. 
Presumably,​ ​according​ ​to​ ​my​ ​informant,​ ​pigeons​ ​perceive​ ​these​ ​Gibsonian​ ​affordances 
directly.​ ​They​ ​would​ ​immediately​ ​look​ ​like​ ​good​ ​nesting​ ​places.​ ​But​ ​it​ ​had​ ​never​ ​occurred 
to​ ​humans​ ​that​ ​it​ ​was​ ​so.​ ​These​ ​affordances​ ​are​ ​not​ ​perceived​ ​by​ ​humans.​ ​But​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not​ ​as​ ​if 
the​ ​matter​ ​is​ ​entirely​ ​opaque​ ​to​ ​us.​ ​For​ ​though​ ​we​ ​cannot​ ​perceive​ ​the​ ​affordances​ ​directly, 
we​ ​can​ ​see​ ​the​ ​reasons​ ​why​ ​the​ ​interstices​ ​would​ ​be​ ​good​ ​for​ ​nesting.​ ​We​ ​do​ ​not​ ​see​ ​the 
affordance​ ​itself;​ ​we​ ​see​ ​the​ ​ground​ ​of​ ​the​ ​affordance. 
4 ​ ​The​ ​phrase​ ​‘objective​ ​perception’​ ​might​ ​understood​ ​in​ ​various​ ​ways.​ ​Here​ ​we​ ​stipulate​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​to​ ​be 




The​ ​ground​ ​of​ ​an​ ​affordance​ ​is​ ​an​ ​intrinsic​ ​feature​ ​of​ ​the​ ​environment​ ​which​ ​explains​ ​that 
affordance.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​the​ ​shapes​ ​of​ ​the​ ​concrete​ ​interstices​ ​explain​ ​why​ ​the​ ​interstices​ ​make 
possible​ ​certain​ ​actions,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​nesting,​ ​and​ ​certain​ ​experiences,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​those​ ​enjoyed​ ​by 
someone​ ​looking​ ​at​ ​the​ ​interstices.​ ​The​ ​grounds​ ​explain​ ​why​ ​these​ ​forms​ ​of​ ​action​ ​and​ ​perception 
are​ ​possibilities,​ ​but​ ​are​ ​in​ ​principle​ ​independent​ ​of​ ​these​ ​possibilities:​ ​if​ ​agents​ ​and​ ​observers 
were​ ​differently​ ​constituted,​ ​the​ ​same​ ​shapes​ ​would​ ​not​ ​afford​ ​the​ ​actions​ ​and​ ​experiences​ ​which 
they​ ​actually​ ​afford.​ ​So​ ​perceiving​ ​the​ ​grounds​ ​of​ ​affordances​ ​is​ ​objective​ ​perception​ ​in​ ​the​ ​sense 
defined​ ​above.  
 
Campbell​ ​claims​ ​that​ ​humans​ ​perceive​ ​the​ ​grounds​ ​of​ ​affordances​ ​rather​ ​than,​ ​or​ ​in​ ​addition​ ​to, 
perceiving​ ​the​ ​affordances.​ ​Now​ ​if​ ​we​ ​perceive​ ​affordances​ ​as​ ​Gibson​ ​thought​ ​(see​ ​also​ ​Nanay, 
2015),​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​well-placed​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​how​ ​we​ ​do​ ​so.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​because,​ ​according​ ​to​ ​our 
proposal,​ ​the​ ​spatial​ ​layout​ ​of​ ​vista​ ​space​ ​is​ ​visible​ ​insofar​ ​as​ ​iterated​ ​matches​ ​of​ ​ ​ ​with​ ​​W​,​ ​andr→  
the​ ​movements​ ​taking​ ​an​ ​observer​ ​between​ ​them,​ ​carry​ ​information​ ​about​ ​the​ ​spatial​ ​layout​ ​of​ ​the 
environment;​ ​in​ ​the​ ​first​ ​instance,​ ​this​ ​information​ ​about​ ​the​ ​environment​ ​is​ ​information​ ​about 
possibilities​ ​for​ ​active​ ​manipulation​ ​of​ ​visual​ ​stimulation​ ​which​ ​the​ ​environment​ ​affords.​ ​But​ ​for 
the​ ​same​ ​reason,​ ​a​ ​natural​ ​challenge​ ​to​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​ill-placed​ ​to​ ​explain 
perception​ ​of​ ​the​ ​grounds​ ​of​ ​these​ ​affordances,​ ​as​ ​opposed​ ​to​ ​the​ ​affordances​ ​themselves. 
  
One​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​this​ ​challenge​ ​insists​ ​that,​ ​in​ ​fact,​ ​the​ ​perceptible​ ​grounds​ ​of​ ​affordances​ ​are​ ​just 
more​ ​affordances.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​the​ ​shapes​ ​of​ ​Campbell’s​ ​concrete​ ​interstices​ ​are​ ​perceptible​ ​by 
humans​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​actions​ ​which​ ​move​ ​an​ ​observer​ ​between​ ​various​ ​values​ ​of​ ​ .​ ​Morer→  
generally,​ ​this​ ​approach​ ​insists,​ ​all​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​spatial​ ​properties​ ​represents​ ​those​ ​properties​ ​in 
terms​ ​of​ ​the​ ​observer’s​ ​actual​ ​and​ ​possible​ ​movements​ ​(Poincare,​ ​1946).​ ​However,​ ​to​ ​address​ ​the 
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challenge​ ​at​ ​its​ ​most​ ​demanding,​ ​suppose​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​objective​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​space,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​sense 
that​ ​we​ ​perceive​ ​spatial​ ​features​ ​which​ ​are​ ​in​ ​principle​ ​independent​ ​of​ ​their​ ​consequences​ ​for 
perception​ ​and​ ​action.​ ​Any​ ​explanation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​capacity​ ​for​ ​objective​ ​perception​ ​that​ ​is​ ​consistent 
with​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​will​ ​have​ ​to​ ​start​ ​from​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​information​ ​about​ ​the​ ​environment’s 
affordances​ ​for​ ​action​ ​and​ ​perception​ ​is​ ​also​ ​information​ ​about​ ​the​ ​grounds​ ​of​ ​those​ ​affordances. 
This​ ​may​ ​seem​ ​unsatisfactory​ ​as​ ​a​ ​basis​ ​for​ ​explaining​ ​objective​ ​perception,​ ​but​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​a 
coordinate​ ​frame​ ​theory​ ​is​ ​in​ ​just​ ​the​ ​same​ ​position. 
 
For​ ​example,​ ​consider​ ​how​ ​objective​ ​perception​ ​might​ ​be​ ​explained​ ​by​ ​a​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​theory 
which​ ​appeals​ ​to​ ​representations​ ​with​ ​a​ ​spatial​ ​format​ ​in​ ​the​ ​cortex,​ ​corresponding​ ​to​ ​the​ ​spatial 
layout​ ​of​ ​vista​ ​space.​ ​In​ ​a​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​this​ ​kind,​ ​the​ ​spatial​ ​arrangement​ ​of​ ​neurons--one​ ​ground​ ​of 
the​ ​representation’s​ ​functional​ ​contribution​ ​to​ ​spatial​ ​perception​ ​and​ ​action--resembles​ ​the​ ​spatial 
layout​ ​of​ ​the​ ​environment--the​ ​grounds​ ​of​ ​the​ ​environment’s​ ​affordances​ ​for​ ​spatial​ ​perception 
and​ ​action.​ ​But​ ​as​ ​we​ ​saw​ ​above,​ ​this​ ​resemblance​ ​does​ ​not​ ​by​ ​itself​ ​explain​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​the 
environment’s​ ​spatial​ ​layout;​ ​a​ ​brain​ ​state​ ​represents​ ​a​ ​feature​ ​of​ ​the​ ​environment​ ​only​ ​insofar​ ​as 
there​ ​are​ ​appropriate​ ​causal​ ​or​ ​explanatory​ ​connections​ ​between​ ​the​ ​feature​ ​represented,​ ​the​ ​brain 
state​ ​that​ ​represents​ ​it,​ ​and/or​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​state’s​ ​contributions​ ​to​ ​action.​ ​That​ ​is,​ ​even​ ​on​ ​a​ ​theory 
which​ ​postulates​ ​cortical​ ​representations​ ​with​ ​a​ ​spatial​ ​format,​ ​the​ ​environment’s​ ​spatial​ ​layout​ ​is 
represented​ ​only​ ​insofar​ ​as​ ​that​ ​layout​ ​provides​ ​affordances​ ​for​ ​action​ ​and​ ​perception.​ ​For 
example,​ ​the​ ​shapes​ ​of​ ​Campbell’s​ ​concrete​ ​interstices​ ​are​ ​represented​ ​only​ ​insofar​ ​as​ ​these​ ​shapes 
provide​ ​affordances​ ​for​ ​action​ ​on​ ​them​ ​and​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​them.​ ​More​ ​generally,​ ​the​ ​grounds​ ​of 
affordances​ ​are​ ​represented​ ​only​ ​insofar​ ​as​ ​information​ ​about​ ​the​ ​affordances​ ​is​ ​also​ ​information 
about​ ​their​ ​grounds.​ ​A​ ​theory​ ​which​ ​postulates​ ​cortical​ ​representations​ ​with​ ​a​ ​spatial​ ​format​ ​is​ ​no 
better​ ​placed​ ​than​ ​our​ ​proposal,​ ​when​ ​it​ ​comes​ ​to​ ​explaining​ ​objective​ ​perception. 
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Not​ ​every​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​theory​ ​will​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​a​ ​spatial​ ​​format​​ ​in​ ​cortical​ ​representations.​ ​Some 
coordinate​ ​frame​ ​theories​ ​may​ ​propose​ ​other​ ​reasons​ ​for​ ​saying​ ​that​ ​brain​ ​states​ ​have​ ​​contents 
expressible​ ​in​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​(Grush​ ​2000).​ ​But​ ​as​ ​we​ ​have​ ​seen,​ ​the​ ​reasons​ ​for​ ​saying 
that​ ​brain​ ​states​ ​have​ ​such​ ​contents​ ​must​ ​lie​ ​in​ ​appropriate​ ​causal​ ​or​ ​explanatory​ ​connections 
between​ ​the​ ​spatial​ ​relations​ ​which​ ​constitute​ ​the​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame,​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​states​ ​that 
represent​ ​those​ ​relations,​ ​and/or​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​states’​ ​contributions​ ​to​ ​action.​ ​So​ ​again,​ ​a​ ​brain​ ​state’s 
coordinate​ ​frame​ ​contents​ ​would​ ​include​ ​the​ ​grounds​ ​of​ ​affordances​ ​for​ ​action​ ​and​ ​perception​ ​only 
insofar​ ​as​ ​those​ ​grounds​ ​provide​ ​affordances​ ​for​ ​action​ ​and​ ​perception.​ ​A​ ​theory​ ​which​ ​postulates 
representations​ ​with​ ​a​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​content​ ​is​ ​no​ ​better​ ​placed​ ​than​ ​our​ ​proposal,​ ​when​ ​it 
comes​ ​to​ ​explaining​ ​objective​ ​perception.  5
 
 
It​ ​is​ ​often​ ​suggested​ ​that​ ​the​ ​key​ ​to​ ​objective​ ​perception​ ​is​ ​representation​ ​in​ ​an​ ​allocentric,​ ​rather 
than​ ​egocentric,​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​(O’Keefe​ ​and​ ​Nadel;​ ​Evans,​ ​1982;​ ​Grush​ ​2000). ​ ​We​ ​now 6
briefly​ ​explain​ ​why​ ​representation​ ​in​ ​an​ ​allocentric​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​is​ ​no​ ​better​ ​placed​ ​than​ ​our 
proposal,​ ​when​ ​it​ ​comes​ ​to​ ​explaining​ ​objective​ ​perception. 
 
An​ ​allocentric,​ ​as​ ​opposed​ ​to​ ​egocentric,​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​is​ ​a​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​whose​ ​origin​ ​and 
axes​ ​are​ ​independent​ ​of​ ​the​ ​observer’s​ ​current​ ​position.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​​O’Keefe’s ​ ​slope/centroid 
model​ ​(1991)​ ​is ​ ​constructed​ ​as ​ ​follows.​ ​By​ ​keeping​ ​track​ ​of​ ​its ​ ​own​ ​movements,​ ​an​ ​organism 
learns ​ ​the​ ​egocentric​ ​vectors ​ ​from​ ​its ​ ​current​ ​position​ ​and​ ​orientation​ ​to​ ​various ​ ​landmarks.​ ​This 
allows ​ ​the​ ​organism​ ​to​ ​compute,​ ​in​ ​addition,​ ​egocentric​ ​vectors ​ ​between​ ​landmarks.​ ​The​ ​​slope​ ​​of 
the​ ​environment​ ​is ​ ​the​ ​average​ ​of​ ​the​ ​gradients ​ ​of​ ​these​ ​vectors.​ ​The​ ​​centroid​​ ​is ​ ​the​ ​‘centre​ ​of 
mass’​ ​of​ ​landmarks ​ ​in​ ​the​ ​environment,​ ​for​ ​example​ ​the​ ​average​ ​of​ ​the​ ​egocentric​ ​vectors ​ ​to 
5 ​ ​For​ ​similar​ ​reasons,​ ​Campbell​ ​(2002)​ ​claims​ ​that​ ​objective​ ​perception​ ​must​ ​be​ ​a​ ​non-representational 
form​ ​of​ ​experience.​ ​Our​ ​position​ ​here​ ​is​ ​neutral​ ​about​ ​this​ ​claim.  
6 ​ ​Things​ ​here​ ​are​ ​complicated​ ​by​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​O’Keefe​ ​and​ ​Nadel​ ​take​ ​a​ ​cognitive​ ​map​ ​in​ ​the 
hippocampus​ ​to​ ​be​ ​the​ ​locus​ ​of​ ​allocentric​ ​and​ ​objective​ ​representation,​ ​while​ ​perception-specific 
systems​ ​operate​ ​in​ ​egocentric​ ​reference​ ​frames.​ ​However,​ ​the​ ​points​ ​which​ ​follow​ ​are​ ​independent​ ​of​ ​this 
particular​ ​view.  
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landmarks.​ ​The​ ​slope​ ​and​ ​the​ ​centroid​ ​are​ ​invariant​ ​with​ ​translations ​ ​of​ ​the​ ​organism’s ​ ​current 
position,​ ​so​ ​allocentric​ ​vectors ​ ​to​ ​goals ​ ​can​ ​be​ ​defined​ ​in​ ​terms ​ ​of​ ​distance​ ​from​ ​the​ ​centroid​ ​and 
angle​ ​from​ ​the​ ​slope. 
  
As​ ​we​ ​defined​ ​it,​ ​objective​ ​perception​ ​is​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​features​ ​which​ ​are​ ​in​ ​principle​ ​independent 
of​ ​the​ ​observer’s​ ​actual​ ​and​ ​possible​ ​experiences​ ​and​ ​actions.​ ​The​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​perception​ ​represents 
spatial​ ​layout​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​allocentric​ ​vectors,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​those​ ​defined​ ​by​ ​O’Keefe’s​ ​model,​ ​does​ ​not 
explain​ ​how​ ​objective​ ​perception​ ​is​ ​possible.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​first​ ​instance,​ ​vectors​ ​are​ ​introduced​ ​into 
O’Keefe’s​ ​model​ ​insofar​ ​as​ ​the​ ​organism​ ​keeps​ ​track​ ​of​ ​its​ ​current​ ​movements.​ ​The​ ​model​ ​then 
explains​ ​how​ ​the​ ​organism’s​ ​representations​ ​abstract​ ​from​ ​its​ ​current​ ​position​ ​and​ ​movements.​ ​But 
that​ ​is​ ​not​ ​the​ ​same​ ​thing​ ​as​ ​abstracting​ ​from​ ​all​ ​possible​ ​positions​ ​and​ ​movements​ ​of​ ​the 
organism.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​if​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​a​ ​vector​ ​was​ ​introduced​ ​into​ ​the​ ​model​ ​as 
representation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​organism’s​ ​current​ ​movement​ ​between​ ​landmarks,​ ​the​ ​abstraction​ ​generates, 
at​ ​best,​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​​some​ ​​movement​ ​of​ ​the​ ​organism​ ​between​ ​landmarks​ ​(movement​ ​which​ ​is 
not​ ​currently​ ​available​ ​to​ ​the​ ​organism).​ ​At​ ​least,​ ​nothing​ ​in​ ​the​ ​model​ ​explains​ ​how​ ​a​ ​further 
abstraction​ ​is​ ​possible,​ ​such​ ​that​ ​the​ ​spatial​ ​features​ ​represented​ ​are​ ​independent​ ​of​ ​the​ ​organism’s 
possible​ ​experiences​ ​and​ ​actions​ ​(Campbell​ ​1993). 
 
Consistent​ ​with​ ​this​ ​last​ ​point,​ ​Grush​ ​(2000)​ ​gives​ ​empirical​ ​reasons​ ​for​ ​thinking​ ​that​ ​O’Keefe’s 
model​ ​should​ ​be​ ​understood​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​a​ ​capacity​ ​for​ ​offline​ ​or​ ​imaginative​ ​adoption​ ​of​ ​an 
‘alter-ego-centric​ ​reference​ ​frame’:​ ​the​ ​organism​ ​represents​ ​allocentric​ ​vectors​ ​by​ ​imagining 
occupying​ ​a​ ​point​ ​of​ ​view​ ​other​ ​than​ ​its​ ​current​ ​one.​ ​Grush​ ​holds​ ​that,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​first​ ​instance, 
perception​ ​represents​ ​spatial​ ​layout​ ​insofar​ ​as​ ​perceptual​ ​representations​ ​contribute​ ​to​ ​skilled 
action;​ ​perceptual​ ​representations​ ​abstract​ ​from​ ​current​ ​affordances​ ​for​ ​action​ ​insofar​ ​as​ ​perceptual 
representations​ ​are​ ​integrated​ ​with​ ​the​ ​offline​ ​or​ ​imaginative​ ​capacity.​ ​On​ ​this​ ​approach,​ ​it​ ​is 
especially​ ​clear​ ​that​ ​the​ ​abstraction​ ​generates,​ ​at​ ​best,​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​some​ ​possible​ ​affordances 
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(those​ ​which​ ​would​ ​be​ ​available​ ​from​ ​a​ ​point​ ​of​ ​view​ ​other​ ​than​ ​the​ ​organism’s​ ​current​ ​one). 
Grush​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​this​ ​amounts​ ​to​ ​a​ ​form​ ​of​ ​objectivity--a​ ​way​ ​of​ ​representing​ ​one’s​ ​current 
location​ ​explicitly,​ ​as​ ​one​ ​location​ ​among​ ​many,​ ​as​ ​opposed​ ​to​ ​representing​ ​one’s​ ​current​ ​location 
only​ ​implicitly,​ ​as​ ​the​ ​origin​ ​of​ ​an​ ​egocentric​ ​frame.​ ​However,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not​ ​clear​ ​why​ ​this​ ​form​ ​of 
objectivity​ ​should​ ​require​ ​an​ ​allocentric​ ​coordinate​ ​frame,​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​a​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​offline​ ​or 
imaginative​ ​occupation​ ​of​ ​a​ ​point​ ​of​ ​view​ ​that​ ​is​ ​consistent​ ​with​ ​our​ ​proposal.​ ​(In​ ​the​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​our 
proposal,​ ​this​ ​might​ ​involve​ ​offline​ ​or​ ​imaginative​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​ ,​ ​​but​ ​discussion​ ​of​ ​imagination,r→  
rather​ ​than​ ​perception,​ ​is​ ​beyond​ ​the​ ​scope​ ​of​ ​this​ ​article.)​ ​Moreover,​ ​Grush’s​ ​limited​ ​form​ ​of 
objectivity​ ​does​ ​not​ ​suffice​ ​for​ ​objective​ ​perception​ ​as​ ​we​ ​defined​ ​it​ ​here.​ ​The​ ​deeper​ ​problem​ ​of 
how​ ​objective​ ​perception​ ​is​ ​achieved​ ​is​ ​not​ ​solved​ ​by​ ​postulating​ ​allocentric​ ​coordinate​ ​frames, 
any​ ​more​ ​than​ ​it​ ​is​ ​solved​ ​by​ ​our​ ​proposal. 
 
In​ ​summary,​ ​a​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​theory​ ​is​ ​no​ ​better​ ​off​ ​than​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​when​ ​it​ ​comes​ ​to 
explaining​ ​either​ ​genuine​ ​perception,​ ​as​ ​opposed​ ​to​ ​mere​ ​sensorimotor​ ​responses,​ ​or​ ​objective 
perception.​ ​This​ ​can​ ​be​ ​obscured​ ​by​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​appeals​ ​immediately​ ​to​ ​action​ ​in​ ​a 
space,​ ​as​ ​the​ ​observer’s​ ​means​ ​of​ ​perceiving​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​layout.​ ​But​ ​in​ ​fact,​ ​even​ ​on​ ​a​ ​coordinate​ ​frame 
theory,​ ​a​ ​brain​ ​state​ ​can​ ​be​ ​said​ ​to​ ​represent​ ​features​ ​of​ ​the​ ​environment​ ​only​ ​insofar​ ​as​ ​there​ ​are 
appropriate​ ​causal​ ​or​ ​explanatory​ ​relations​ ​between​ ​these​ ​features,​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​state,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​brain 
state’s​ ​contributions​ ​to​ ​action.​ ​The​ ​same​ ​resources​ ​are​ ​available​ ​on​ ​our​ ​proposal. 
 
6.3 Challenges​ ​in​ ​relation​ ​to​ ​neuroscience 
6.3.1 Where​ ​is​ ​W? 
We​ ​have​ ​described​ ​the​ ​set​ ​of​ ​stored​ ​contexts,​ ​​W​,​ ​in​ ​a​ ​very​ ​general​ ​way​ ​since​ ​the​ ​location​ ​of 
these​ ​synaptic​ ​weights​ ​is​ ​not​ ​critical​ ​to​ ​the​ ​argument.​ ​To​ ​illustrate​ ​this​ ​point​ ​we​ ​describe​ ​here 
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two​ ​examples​ ​of​ ​a​ ​motor​ ​response​ ​to​ ​a​ ​sensory+motivational​ ​context.​ ​In​ ​one,​ ​the​ ​critical 
neurons​ ​are​ ​in​ ​the​ ​spinal​ ​cord​ ​while​ ​in​ ​the​ ​other​ ​the​ ​fluctuation​ ​of​ ​firing​ ​rate​ ​of​ ​a​ ​single​ ​neuron 
in​ ​the​ ​cortex​ ​moves​ ​ ​ ​from​ ​one​ ​Voronoi​ ​region​ ​to​ ​another.​ ​In​ ​a​ ​patellar​ ​reflex,​ ​the​ ​mostr→  
important​ ​afferents​ ​that​ ​determine​ ​the​ ​sensory​ ​context​ ​are​ ​from​ ​stretch​ ​receptors​ ​in​ ​the 
quadriceps​ ​muscle​ ​and​ ​the​ ​critical​ ​synapses​ ​are​ ​with​ ​alpha​ ​motor​ ​neurons​ ​in​ ​the​ ​spinal​ ​cord, 
although​ ​the​ ​briskness​ ​of​ ​the​ ​reflex​ ​can​ ​be​ ​modulated​ ​by​ ​input​ ​from​ ​higher​ ​levels​ ​in​ ​the​ ​nervous 
system.​ ​​ ​These​ ​stretch​ ​receptor​ ​afferents​ ​can​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​to​ ​be​ ​part​ ​of​ ​ ​ ​and​ ​the​ ​effectivenessr→  
of​ ​the​ ​spinal​ ​synapses​ ​is​ ​recorded​ ​in .​ ​Described​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​our​ ​proposal,​ ​a​ ​patellar​ ​reflexW  
corresponds​ ​to​ ​an​ ​extremely​ ​large​ ​Voronoi​ ​region​ ​because​ ​the​ ​same​ ​output​ ​is​ ​triggered​ ​by​ ​a 
very​ ​large​ ​range​ ​of​ ​values​ ​of​ ​ .​ ​(Since​ ​ ​ ​is​ ​a​ ​vector​ ​and​ ​especially​ ​as​ ​it​ ​always​ ​has​ ​the​ ​samer→ r→  
length,​ ​it​ ​might​ ​be​ ​more​ ​appropriate​ ​to​ ​talk​ ​of​ ​the​ ​‘direction’​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​‘value’​ ​of​ ​ ,​ ​but​ ​forr→  
the​ ​sake​ ​of​ ​simplicity,​ ​we​ ​have​ ​used​ ​the​ ​term​ ​‘value’​ ​throughout.)​ ​In​ ​a​ ​quite​ ​different​ ​example, 
the​ ​firing​ ​rate​ ​of​ ​a​ ​single​ ​neuron​ ​in​ ​V5/MT​ ​could​ ​move​ ​ ​ ​from​ ​one​ ​Voronoi​ ​region​ ​to​ ​another,r→  
reversing​ ​the​ ​perceived​ ​direction​ ​of​ ​motion​ ​of​ ​a​ ​rotating​ ​cylinder​ ​(Dodd​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​2001).​ ​On​ ​the 
critical​ ​trials,​ ​the​ ​direction​ ​of​ ​motion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​cylinder​ ​is​ ​ambiguous.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​debate​ ​about​ ​how 
many​ ​neurons​ ​might​ ​need​ ​to​ ​vary​ ​their​ ​firing​ ​rate​ ​to​ ​cause​ ​(or​ ​reflect,​ ​Nienborg​ ​and​ ​Cumming, 
2009;​ ​Cumming​ ​and​ ​Nienborg,​ ​2016)​ ​a​ ​change​ ​in​ ​perception​ ​​ ​but​ ​it​ ​is​ ​clear​ ​that​ ​fluctuations​ ​in 
the​ ​firing​ ​rate​ ​of​ ​a​ ​single​ ​neuron​ ​are​ ​highly​ ​predictive​ ​of​ ​the​ ​animal’s​ ​choice.​ ​This​ ​means​ ​that​ ​a 
tiny​ ​change​ ​in​ ​the​ ​value​ ​of​ ​ ​ ​causes​ ​it​ ​to​ ​cross​ ​the​ ​boundary​ ​between​ ​two​ ​Voronoi​ ​regions.​ ​Ther→  
elements​ ​of​ ​ ​ ​that​ ​are​ ​common​ ​to​ ​both​ ​regions​ ​define​ ​the​ ​context​ ​(the​ ​animal​ ​is​ ​doing​ ​anr→  
experiment,​ ​it​ ​knows​ ​it​ ​has​ ​to​ ​maintain​ ​fixation​ ​and​ ​attend​ ​to​ ​the​ ​direction​ ​of​ ​motion​ ​of​ ​the 
cylinder,​ ​etc)​ ​while​ ​the​ ​firing​ ​of​ ​only​ ​a​ ​tiny​ ​number​ ​of​ ​neurons​ ​(in​ ​theory,​ ​even​ ​a​ ​single​ ​neuron) 
determine​ ​whether​ ​the​ ​animal​ ​perceives​ ​the​ ​cylinder​ ​as​ ​rotating​ ​left​ ​or​ ​right.​ ​In​ ​this​ ​example,​ ​a 
large​ ​range​ ​of​ ​different​ ​inputs​ ​contribute​ ​to​ ​the​ ​decision​ ​(mostly​ ​defining​ ​the​ ​context​ ​but​ ​a​ ​few 
determining​ ​the​ ​perceived​ ​rotation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​cylinder​ ​as​ ​clockwise​ ​or​ ​anticlockwise)​ ​and​ ​these​ ​need 
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to​ ​be​ ​brought​ ​together​ ​in​ ​one​ ​place.​ ​Where​ ​this​ ​might​ ​happen​ ​in​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​is​ ​up​ ​for​ ​discussion. 
One​ ​possibility​ ​might​ ​be​ ​the​ ​cerebellum​ ​which​ ​receives​ ​input​ ​from​ ​all​ ​over​ ​the​ ​cortex,​ ​has​ ​a 
much​ ​more​ ​significant​ ​input​ ​than​ ​the​ ​cortico-spinal​ ​tract,​ ​is​ ​able​ ​to​ ​compare​ ​long​ ​input​ ​vectors 
with​ ​large​ ​numbers​ ​of​ ​vectors​ ​of​ ​stored​ ​weights​ ​(Marr,​ ​1969;​ ​Albus,​ ​1971;​ ​Eccles​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​1967; 
Manzoni,​ ​2005)​ ​and​ ​is​ ​known​ ​to​ ​use​ ​multi-modal​ ​contexts​ ​to​ ​control​ ​motor​ ​output.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​also 
a​ ​considerable​ ​literature​ ​on​ ​the​ ​possible​ ​role​ ​of​ ​the​ ​cerebellum​ ​in​ ​cognition​ ​(Schmahmann, 
2004).​ ​Other​ ​regions​ ​that​ ​have​ ​a​ ​wide​ ​range​ ​of​ ​both​ ​sensory​ ​and​ ​motivational​ ​inputs​ ​and​ ​that 
may​ ​be​ ​relevant​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​in​ ​any​ ​discussion​ ​of​ ​a​ ​biological​ ​implementation​ ​include​ ​the​ ​basal 
ganglia​ ​(Krauzlis​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​2014)​ ​and​ ​the​ ​prefrontal​ ​cortex​ ​(Mante​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​2013). 
 
6.3.2 Coordinate​ ​transformations​ ​(or​ ​not)​ ​in​ ​posterior​ ​parietal​ ​cortex 
In​ ​many​ ​accounts​ ​of​ ​coordinate​ ​transformations,​ ​posterior​ ​parietal​ ​cortex​ ​plays​ ​a​ ​special​ ​role​ ​as 
the​ ​site​ ​of​ ​different​ ​ego-centric​ ​coordinate​ ​frames​ ​and​ ​as​ ​a​ ​way-station​ ​in​ ​the​ ​process​ ​of 
transforming​ ​visual​ ​information​ ​into​ ​an​ ​allocentric​ ​frame.​ ​Here,​ ​we​ ​take​ ​the​ ​example​ ​of​ ​data 
that​ ​has​ ​been​ ​cited​ ​as​ ​evidence​ ​of​ ​a​ ​‘hand-centred’​ ​or​ ​‘head-centred’​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​visual 
space​ ​and​ ​consider​ ​it​ ​in​ ​relation​ ​to​ ​two​ ​extreme​ ​interpretations​ ​of​ ​this​ ​notion.​ ​For​ ​example, 
‘hand-centred’​ ​neurons​ ​respond​ ​selectively​ ​to​ ​the​ ​direction​ ​and​ ​distance​ ​of​ ​a​ ​target​ ​object​ ​from 
the​ ​hand​ ​(Buneo​ ​and​ ​Andersen,​ ​2006)​ ​and​ ​‘gaze-direction’​ ​neurons​ ​respond​ ​best​ ​when​ ​a​ ​target 
is​ ​at​ ​a​ ​given​ ​retinal​ ​location​ ​and​ ​the​ ​eye​ ​has​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​position​ ​with​ ​respect​ ​to​ ​the​ ​head​ ​(Zipser 
and​ ​Andersen,​ ​1988;​ ​Pouget​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​2002).​ ​Taken​ ​literally,​ ​transforming​ ​3D​ ​visual​ ​information​ ​to 
a​ ​hand-centred​ ​frame​ ​could​ ​mean​ ​the​ ​following.​ ​Suppose​ ​that​ ​an​ ​observer​ ​holds​ ​up​ ​their​ ​hand 
so​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​in​ ​front​ ​of​ ​their​ ​face.​ ​Then,​ ​two​ ​axes​ ​of​ ​the​ ​hand-centred​ ​frame​ ​would​ ​map​ ​onto​ ​two 
axes​ ​of​ ​the​ ​visual​ ​reference​ ​frame​ ​(x​vis​​ ​and​ ​y​vis​​ ​map​ ​onto​ ​x​hand​​ ​and​ ​y​hand​,​ ​say)​ ​while​ ​the​ ​third 
visual​ ​axis,​ ​derived​ ​from​ ​the​ ​disparity​ ​tuning​ ​of​ ​neurons​ ​in​ ​V1,​ ​say,​ ​maps​ ​onto​ ​the​ ​third​ ​axis​ ​of 
the​ ​hand-centred​ ​frame​ ​(z​vis​ ​​maps​ ​onto​ ​z​hand​).​ ​Now​ ​consider​ ​what​ ​happens​ ​to​ ​the​ ​representation 
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of​ ​the​ ​entire​ ​visual​ ​scene​ ​when​ ​the​ ​hand​ ​rotates​ ​to​ ​be​ ​palm​ ​up.​ ​z​vis​​ ​now​ ​maps​ ​onto​ ​y​hand​​ ​while​ ​y​vis 
maps​ ​onto​ ​z​hand​.​ ​An​ ​intermediate​ ​hand​ ​position​ ​would​ ​require​ ​some​ ​complex​ ​mix​ ​of​ ​disparity 
sensitivity​ ​and​ ​local​ ​sign​ ​information​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​which​ ​V1​ ​firing​ ​rates​ ​were​ ​transferred​ ​to 
which​ ​neurons​ ​in​ ​the​ ​hand-centred​ ​frame.​ ​The​ ​process​ ​would​ ​be​ ​even​ ​more​ ​complicated​ ​if​ ​the 
hand​ ​translated​ ​to​ ​a​ ​different​ ​location​ ​because​ ​then​ ​the​ ​depth​ ​of​ ​scene​ ​points​ ​would​ ​need​ ​to​ ​play 
a​ ​role​ ​in​ ​calculation.​ ​But​ ​in​ ​any​ ​case,​ ​all​ ​this​ ​must​ ​happen​ ​rapidly​ ​as​ ​the​ ​hand​ ​moves​ ​and,​ ​by 
assumption,​ ​it​ ​applies​ ​to​ ​the​ ​whole​ ​visual​ ​field.​ ​The​ ​processes​ ​would​ ​generate​ ​a​ ​representation 
of​ ​the​ ​whole​ ​visual​ ​scene​ ​and​ ​would​ ​follow​ ​the​ ​format​ ​of​ ​a​ ​visual​ ​representation​ ​such​ ​as​ ​that​ ​in 
V1​ ​but​ ​now​ ​centred​ ​on​ ​the​ ​hand​ ​and​ ​oriented​ ​according​ ​to​ ​the​ ​pose​ ​of​ ​the​ ​hand.​ ​Data​ ​supporting 
such​ ​a​ ​literal​ ​transformation​ ​in​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​would​ ​be​ ​strong​ ​evidence​ ​against​ ​our​ ​proposal.  
 
A​ ​much​ ​less​ ​extreme​ ​version​ ​of​ ​an​ ​‘ego-centred​ ​representation’​ ​is​ ​when​ ​a​ ​neuron​ ​responds​ ​to​ ​a 
combination​ ​of​ ​sensory​ ​cues​ ​that​ ​are​ ​relevant​ ​to​ ​a​ ​potential​ ​movement.​ ​In​ ​ventral​ ​premotor 
cortex,​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​which​ ​is​ ​involved​ ​with​ ​the​ ​preparation​ ​of​ ​movement,​ ​some​ ​neurons​ ​have 
both​ ​a​ ​tactile​ ​receptive​ ​field​ ​on​ ​the​ ​arm​ ​and​ ​a​ ​visual​ ​receptive​ ​field​ ​but​ ​the​ ​neuron​ ​responds 
most​ ​strongly​ ​when​ ​the​ ​visual​ ​stimulus​ ​comes​ ​towards​ ​the​ ​tactile​ ​receptive​ ​field.​ ​It​ ​does​ ​this 
despite​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​a​ ​variety​ ​of​ ​other​ ​factors​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the​ ​animal’s​ ​eye​ ​position,​ ​arm​ ​position 
relative​ ​to​ ​the​ ​body​ ​or​ ​of​ ​arm​ ​position​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​the​ ​scene​ ​(Graziano​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​1994).​ ​Responses 
with​ ​these​ ​characteristics​ ​reflect​ ​sensitivity​ ​to​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​combination​ ​of​ ​stimuli​ ​(including​ ​the 
relative​ ​visual​ ​direction​ ​between​ ​the​ ​hand​ ​and​ ​the​ ​target)​ ​but​ ​it​ ​is​ ​quite​ ​possible​ ​that​ ​that​ ​is​ ​​all 
they​ ​need​ ​to​ ​do,​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​being​ ​a​ ​stepping​ ​stone​ ​in​ ​a​ ​coordinate​ ​transformation​ ​as​ ​described 
above.​ ​Of​ ​course,​ ​neurons​ ​that​ ​are​ ​sensitive​ ​to​ ​a​ ​combination​ ​of​ ​inputs​ ​from​ ​two​ ​modalities​ ​are 
common​ ​​(​Zipser​ ​and​ ​Andersen,​ ​1988;​ ​Pouget​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​2002).​ ​Pouget​ ​et​ ​al​ ​have​ ​shown​ ​how​ ​such 
neurons​ ​could​ ​be​ ​involved​ ​in​ ​a​ ​coordinate​ ​transformation​ ​(Fig​ ​3)​ ​but​ ​their​ ​existence​ ​does​ ​not, 
by​ ​itself,​ ​support​ ​the​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​a​ ​true​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​transformation.​ ​Indeed,​ ​this​ ​type​ ​of​ ​logical 
‘AND’​ ​operation​ ​is​ ​useful​ ​for​ ​reducing​ ​redundancy​ ​in​ ​the​ ​output​ ​from​ ​the​ ​cortex​ ​and​ ​is​ ​widely 
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recognized​ ​as​ ​an​ ​important​ ​cortical​ ​operation​ ​without​ ​being​ ​part​ ​of​ ​coordinate​ ​transformations 
(Barlow,​ ​2001;​ ​Földiak,​ ​1990). 
 
6.3.3 Processing​ ​of​ ​sensory​ ​input​ ​to​ ​generate​ ​ r→  
In​ ​describing​ ​our​ ​proposal,​ ​we​ ​have​ ​said​ ​little​ ​about​ ​the​ ​role​ ​of​ ​the​ ​cerebral​ ​cortex.​ ​In​ ​particular, 
we​ ​have​ ​claimed​ ​that​ ​at​ ​the​ ​stage​ ​ ​ ​is​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​the​ ​rows​ ​of​ ​​W,​ ​ ​ ​does​ ​not​ ​consist​ ​of​ ​3Dr→ r→  
coordinates​ ​in​ ​an​ ​ego-​ ​or​ ​allocentric​ ​frame​ ​derived​ ​from​ ​visual,​ ​retinotopic​ ​coordinates​ ​by​ ​a​ ​3D 
transformation​ ​process.​ ​Note​ ​that​ ​the​ ​proposal​ ​that​ ​ ​ ​is​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​​W​​ ​does​ ​not,​ ​by​ ​itself,​ ​rule​ ​thisr→  
out.​ ​Almost​ ​any​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​can​ ​be​ ​couched​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​ ​ ​and​ ​​W,​​ ​including​ ​one​ ​in​ ​which​ ​r→ r→  
lists​ ​the​ ​3D​ ​location​ ​of​ ​the​ ​observer​ ​and​ ​various​ ​objects​ ​in​ ​the​ ​scene​ ​while​ ​each​ ​row​ ​of​ ​​W​​ ​consists 
of​ ​a​ ​similar​ ​list​ ​of​ ​3D​ ​coordinates.​ ​We​ ​have​ ​suggested​ ​that​ ​the​ ​cortex​ ​has​ ​an​ ​important​ ​role​ ​in 
redundancy​ ​reduction,​ ​but​ ​this​ ​is​ ​a​ ​long​ ​way​ ​from​ ​the​ ​type​ ​of​ ​processing​ ​that​ ​would​ ​be​ ​required​ ​to 
transform​ ​the​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​objects​ ​between​ ​different​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frames. 
 
Figure​ ​3.​ ​Neural​ ​response​ ​to​ ​a​ ​combination​ ​of​ ​cues​ ​(adapted​ ​from​ ​Pouget​ ​et​ ​al​ ​2002).​ ​ ​The 
firing​ ​rate​ ​of​ ​a​ ​putative​ ​neuron​ ​is​ ​shown.​ ​The​ ​neuron​ ​has​ ​a​ ​retinal​ ​receptive​ ​field​ ​but​ ​the​ ​gain​ ​of 
the​ ​response​ ​is​ ​modulated​ ​by​ ​eye​ ​position​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​the​ ​head.​ ​As​ ​a​ ​result​ ​it​ ​responds​ ​best​ ​when 
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the​ ​stimulus​ ​is​ ​in​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​retinal​ ​location​ ​​AND​​ ​the​ ​eye​ ​has​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​position​ ​relative​ ​to​ ​the 
head.​ ​Units​ ​are​ ​arbitrary. 
 
6.3.4 Learning​ ​W 
We​ ​have​ ​assumed​ ​in​ ​our​ ​discussion​ ​that​ ​​W​​ ​is​ ​already​ ​learned.​ ​A​ ​proper​ ​consideration​ ​of​ ​how​ ​that 
might​ ​occur​ ​(and​ ​how​ ​large​ ​​W​​ ​might​ ​need​ ​to​ ​be)​ ​is​ ​beyond​ ​the​ ​scope​ ​of​ ​this​ ​paper​ ​but​ ​it​ ​is​ ​clear 
that​ ​the​ ​learning​ ​of​ ​​W​​ ​presents​ ​a​ ​serious​ ​challenge.​ ​Recent​ ​developments​ ​in​ ​computer​ ​vision​ ​are 
relevant,​ ​particularly​ ​end-to-end​ ​learning​ ​of​ ​tasks​ ​in​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​environment​ ​such​ ​as​ ​grasping​ ​objects 
(Pinto​ ​and​ ​Gupta,​ ​2016)​ ​or​ ​navigating​ ​from​ ​one​ ​place/image​ ​to​ ​another​ ​(Zhu​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​2016).​ ​These 
algorithms​ ​do​ ​not​ ​represent​ ​the​ ​environment​ ​using​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​and​ ​Zhu​ ​​et​ ​al​ ​​learn​ ​using 
a​ ​combination​ ​of​ ​signals​ ​about​ ​the​ ​current​ ​image​ ​and​ ​the​ ​goal​ ​image​ ​(analogous​ ​to​ ​ ​ ​and​ ​s→ t→ 
contributing​ ​to​ ​ ​ ​in​ ​our​ ​proposal).​ ​Classification​ ​in​ ​deep​ ​artificial​ ​neural​ ​networks​ ​has​ ​beenr→  
described​ ​as​ ​an​ ​input​ ​feature​ ​vector​ ​being​ ​compared​ ​with​ ​many​ ​stored​ ​feature​ ​vectors​ ​in 
4096-dimensional​ ​continuous​ ​space,​ ​where​ ​the​ ​similarity​ ​is​ ​measured​ ​as​ ​correlation​ ​between​ ​the 
current​ ​and​ ​the​ ​stored​ ​feature​ ​vectors​ ​(Krizhevsky​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​2012).​ ​This​ ​is​ ​similar​ ​to​ ​Equation​ ​(2) 
above​ ​and​ ​to​ ​the​ ​idea​ ​that​ ​ ​ ​will​ ​always​ ​fall​ ​within​ ​a​ ​Voronoi​ ​region​ ​around​ ​a​ ​stored​ ​vector,r→  
w(i,*)​. 
7. Conclusions 
We​ ​have​ ​proposed​ ​that​ ​perception​ ​and​ ​action​ ​are​ ​achieved​ ​through​ ​a​ ​process​ ​of​ ​comparing​ ​a 
vector,​ ​ ,​ ​with​ ​a​ ​weight​ ​matrix,​ ​​W​​ ​(a​ ​long​ ​look-up​ ​table),​ ​to​ ​choose​ ​an​ ​output​ ​and​ ​that​ ​in​ ​order​ ​forr→  
perception​ ​and​ ​action​ ​to​ ​be​ ​achieved​ ​in​ ​this​ ​way,​ ​representation​ ​in​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frames​ ​is​ ​not 
required.​ ​One​ ​advantage​ ​of​ ​our​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​that​ ​it​ ​appeals​ ​to​ ​neural​ ​operations​ ​that​ ​are​ ​well 
accepted​ ​(the​ ​comparison​ ​of​ ​a​ ​vector​ ​of​ ​firing​ ​rates​ ​with​ ​many​ ​similar​ ​vectors​ ​stored​ ​as​ ​synaptic 
weights),​ ​whereas​ ​there​ ​are​ ​few​ ​specific​ ​proposals​ ​and​ ​no​ ​convincing​ ​evidence​ ​for​ ​neural 
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operations​ ​that​ ​carry​ ​out​ ​the​ ​type​ ​of​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​transformation​ ​that​ ​would​ ​turn​ ​a​ ​visual​ ​3D 
representation​ ​into​ ​an​ ​egocentric​ ​and​ ​then​ ​an​ ​allocentric​ ​3D​ ​representation.​ ​Almost​ ​all​ ​theories​ ​of 
the​ ​brain​ ​could​ ​be​ ​cast​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​generating​ ​a​ ​vector​ ​ ​ ​that​ ​is​ ​then​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​a​ ​set​ ​of​ ​storedr→  
contexts,​ ​​W​,​ ​but​ ​we​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​the​ ​computations​ ​leading​ ​to​ ​the​ ​generation​ ​of​ ​ ​ ​are​ ​relativelyr→  
simple​ ​and,​ ​in​ ​particular,​ ​that​ ​they​ ​do​ ​not​ ​include​ ​the​ ​calculation​ ​of​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​transformations. 
We​ ​have​ ​argued​ ​that​ ​when​ ​it​ ​comes​ ​to​ ​meeting​ ​the​ ​philosophical​ ​demands​ ​on​ ​a​ ​theory​ ​of 
perception,​ ​a​ ​3D​ ​coordinate​ ​frame​ ​theory​ ​is​ ​no​ ​better​ ​placed​ ​than​ ​our​ ​proposal.​ ​The​ ​real​ ​test​ ​of​ ​our 
proposal​ ​is​ ​in​ ​its​ ​empirical​ ​predictions​ ​and​ ​we​ ​have​ ​set​ ​out​ ​some​ ​here.​ ​But​ ​in​ ​future,​ ​it​ ​may​ ​be 
computer​ ​vision​ ​that​ ​sets​ ​the​ ​agenda,​ ​providing​ ​new​ ​hypotheses​ ​about​ ​possible​ ​representations​ ​of​ ​a 
3D​ ​world​ ​and​ ​how​ ​to​ ​interact​ ​with​ ​it. 
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